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1. Introduction 
 
This article critically examines the consensus among tort scholars that an injured view is not 
in any circumstances actionable under English nuisance law or, as Richard Buckley puts it, 
that ‘it has long been clear that the law of nuisance does not confer protection upon enjoyment 
by an occupier of an attractive view or prospect.’
1
 The ‘authority’ on which the consensus 
rests is Bland v Moseley,
2
 an unreported Tudor case in which Sir Christopher Wray CJ stated 
that no action in nuisance lies for ‘stopping’ a ‘pleasing prospect’. There are, I argue, reasons 
to doubt that this case strongly supports the consensus. One is that the claim centred on loss 
of light, thus Wray’s categorical denial of liability in nuisance for causing injury to a 
neighbour’s view is obiter. Another is that Wray’s approach does not appear to have 
withstood nineteenth century modernisation in the law. In particular, it is difficult to reconcile 
with Lord Westbury’s opinion in Tipping v St Helen’s Smelting
3
 that nuisance remedies 
‘sensible personal discomfort’, covering anything that ‘injuriously affects the senses or the 
nerves’. 
The idea under consideration of a mismatch between formal law and academic 
exposition opens onto well-charted territory. David Sugarman made an important contribution 
to this with his critique of the ‘English textbook tradition’.
4
  Sugarman’s thesis is that 
Victorian and Edwardian-era legal scholars, exemplified by Professor Frederick Pollock, 
wrote textbooks that emphasised the permanence of common law principles, downplaying 
their changeability. They did so in order to counter a negative impression of the common law 
as chaotic and unpredictable, and thereby unworthy of a university education. The crucial part 
of Sugarman’s analysis for present purposes is that textbook understandings of the common 
law are ‘not reducible’ to the law itself.
5
 Against this, William Twining has suggested that 
formative legal scholars were attuned to the common law’s spontaneity, and that Pollock was 
in fact in the vanguard of a proto-realist understanding of ‘living law’.
6
 In defence of 
Sugarman, I argue that Pollock and other scholars writing about nuisance overlooked the 
modernity of contemporary case law.  The problematic consensus regarding Bland is an 
important legacy of this. 
The analysis begins with close attention to the decision in Bland, in its social and 
economic context (section 2). Beyond the relatively minor difficulty arising from the absence 
                                                           
1
 R A Buckley, Law of Nuisance (Butterworth 1981) 34. Similarly emphatic language can be found in more 
general tort texts, such as Keith Stanton’s statement regarding nuisance that ‘loss of view...is the most obvious 
form of loss that is excluded’ (K Stanton, The Modern Law of Tort (Sweet and Maxwell 1994) 391). 
2
 National Archives, KB 27/1302 m 254 (Trinity 1587); Harvard Law School MS 16 fol 402, reproduced in J 
Baker and S F C Milsom (eds), Sources of English Legal History (OUP 1986) 598. 
3
 (1865) 11 HL Cas 642. 
4
 D Sugarman, ‘Legal Theory, the Common Law Mind and the Making of the Textbook Tradition’, in W 
Twining (ed), Legal Theory and the Common Law (Basil Blackwell 1986) 26.  
5
 Ibid 28. 
6 W Twining, Blackstone’s Tower (Sweet and Maxwell 1994) 136. See further n 47 and associated text. 
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of an official report of this case,
7
 lie more substantial difficulties centring on the content of 
Wray’s judgment. The ratio of the case is that an interference with a neighbour’s light, such as 
to cause ‘terrible darkness’, is actionable, because it renders land uninhabitable. In medieval 
and early modern times, the words ‘view’, ‘prospect’ and ‘light’ were used interchangeably, 
and it is against this backdrop that Wray sought to introduce doctrinal precision, by 
distinguishing between injury to light (as something which is actionable because it is essential 
to the enjoyment of all land), and injury to a view of pleasing scenery (as something which is 
not). The dichotomy between light and view fitted broadly adequately with contemporary 
modes of enjoying property, for whilst possession of a pleasing view was ‘necessary’ to the 
landed elite - which invested heavily in beautiful property both for its intrinsic aesthetic value 
and as a symbol of grandeur - this investment was protected by the law of waste.  
Attention is then given to modernisation in the definition of actionable injury in the 
nineteenth century, through the reception into law of Lord Westbury’s opinion in Tipping 
(Section 3). Lord Westbury reasoned that things which are pleasing to some properties but not 
others do sound in nuisance, albeit on a locality-specific basis that differs from the universal 
actionability of physical injury. The remarks in Tipping about actionable injury are situated 
alongside a line of cases of the 1850s, concerning unpleasant odours from brickworks (Walter 
v Selfe,
8
  Hole v Barlow
9
 and Bamford v Turnley).
10
 They highlight significant differences of 
judicial opinion as to whether nuisance law protected against injured sensibility in the absence 
of ‘physicality’. Lord Westbury’s speech in Tipping provided resolution. In some of the 
literature, this aspect of Tipping is interpreted as a response to industrial pollution, and the 
perceived need to differentiate between the interests of proprietors in town and country.
11
 By 
contrast, I argue that Lord Westbury was principally responding to the emergence of suburbia, 
whose bourgeois residents invested heavily in the look (and smell etc) of land, without the 
security of the elite-oriented law of waste. That created a vacuum filled by nuisance law. 
Section 4 addresses doctrinal reasons that sometimes are advanced in support of the 
permanence of the ‘Rule in Bland’. Consideration is given to six reasons in particular, viz: (i) 
‘sensible personal discomfort’ does not engage the sense of sight; (ii) ‘discomfort’ is not an 
aesthetic criterion; (iii) an injured view is not an ‘emanation’ from land; (iv) a neighbour 
wishing to protect a pleasing view can adequately do so through agreeing a restrictive 
covenant; (v) the management of pleasing views is the province of planning regulation; and 
(vi) excluding this injury is necessary to control the floodgates of nuisance litigation. This 
reasoning is untested judicially, for no one has (ever) brought an English common law 
                                                           
7
 The significance of the unreported status of this case is that judges may decline to accept submissions on points 
of law arising from it, although it is unlikely they would do so in the context of a case as ‘celebrated’ as this: 
Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Practice Direction: Citation of Authorities (2012) [10].  
(https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Practice+Directions/lcj-pract-dir-citation-
authorities-2012.pdf). 
8
 (1851) 4 De G & Sm 315. 
9
 (1858) 140 ER 1113. 
10
 (1860) 122 E.R. 25. 
11  Notably J Brenner, ‘Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution’ (1974) 3 Journal of Legal Studies 403 
(arguing that Lord Westbury sought to facilitating the industrialisation of towns and cities).  For qualified 
support, see J McLaren, ‘Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution: Some Lessons from Social History’ 
(1983) 3 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 155. For a broadly supportive judicial statement, see Lord Hoffmann 
in Hunter v Canary Wharf [1995] AC 665, 705. Cf B Pontin, ‘Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution: A 
Reinterpretation of Doctrine and Institutional Competence’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 1010.  
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nuisance claim seeking a remedy for loss of a pleasing view.
12
 Elsewhere in the common law 
world, interferences with pleasing views have occasionally found protection, broadly within 
the parameters of Tipping. The clearest example is the South African case of Waterhouse 
Properties v Hyperception Properties,
13
 in which obstruction of a ‘beautiful’ view was held 
actionable in nuisance by virtue of a property and locality that was ‘pretty’ and ‘exclusive’.  
It is concluded (in section 5) that whilst the topic of injury to a view is easily 
dismissed as rather niche, and indeed of modest practical importance - ‘a broken window is 
more important than a broken view’
14
 - in reality, injury of this kind can be a very serious 
matter, not only in private law but also in public law terms.
15
 Sugarman’s critique of the 
textbook tradition in relation to the topic at hand is best understood not as an outright 
rejection of doctrinal scholarship (in favour of, say, a more theoretical or empirical 
‘alternative’),
16
 as much as a call for greater emphasis on the inherent corrigibility of doctrinal 
exposition, mirroring case law itself. Obviously, whether a claim in nuisance lies for an 
injured view is ultimately a matter for the courts, but it is hoped that the material explored 
below will be useful in helping arrive at a decision, when at last the time arrives. 
 
2. The Rule in Bland v Moseley  
 
This section addresses medieval and early modern nuisance law relating to injured views. In 
its very earliest iteration, eight or more centuries ago, nuisance law principally remedied 
interferences with agrarian usages of land (e.g. raising or lowering of hedges, dykes, 
millponds, or obstruction of roads).
17
 Complaints about what can be loosely called ‘residential 
amenity’ are not discernible until the 1300s, in connection with the assize of nuisance.
18
 
Intriguingly, a substantial number of complaints in this setting centred on loss of view. For 
example, in a case of 1329, John and Isabel de Castleacre successfully protected from 
                                                           
12
 For occasional chancery court cases on this point, see below n 121 and 125.  
13
[2004] ZAFSHC 97. 
14
 J Murphy, The Law of Nuisance (Oxford University Press 2010), 43.  
15 For a robust statement of the public interest in beauty scenery, backed by public law provision, see 
Parliamentary debate on the Florence Convention (Council of Europe, European Landscape Convention (2000)), 
and in particular Lord Judd:  
 
‘What is a society worth living in? It is a society that values landscape, beauty and aesthetic 
considerations. If we undermine those, what on earth are we doing?’ (House of Lords Debates, 13 June 
2008, col 763) 
 
See further J Holder, ‘Law and Landscape: The Legal Construction and Protection of Hedgerows’ (1999) 62 
Modern Law Review 100. By contrast, the concern in this article is with private law. 
16
 See F Cownie, ‘Are we Witnessing the Death of the Textbook Tradition’ (2006) 3 European Journal of Legal 
Education 79 (on the role of UK research funding regimes on lowering the esteem of textbooks) and, more 
generally, the on-going debate over whether doctrinal scholarship might be abandoned altogether (R Gestel et al, 
Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A Transatlantic Dialogue (Cambridge University Press 2017), especially Part II. 
17 S F C Milsom, The Historical Foundations of the Common Law (Butterworths 1969) 118; D Coquillette, 
‘Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at some Historic Property Cases about the Environment’ (1979) 64 
Cornell L R 761, 770; J Loengard, ‘The Assize of Nuisance: Origins of an Action at Common Law (1978) 37 
Cambridge Law Journal 144. 
18
 See especially the records of the London assizes. London Assize of Nuisance, 1301-1441: A Calendar (London 
Records Society 1973). 
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obstruction a view of an adjoining courtyard.
19
 Two years later, Isabel Goldchep obtained a 
remedy against John Ruddok, who ‘piled up his firewood against her window so high above 
the upper stone frame that it is completely obscured, and the light, view, air and clarity 
(claritatem) impeded’.
20
 Complaints about loss of view are as common as those directed at 
loss of light and polluted air, and far outnumbered complaints about noise. 
Yet it is unclear that parties in these cases were using the term ‘view’ in a 
recognisably modern sense, of aesthetically pleasing scenery.
21
 Janet Loengard suggests that 
injury to view (visum) and light (lumen) typically were pleaded interchangeably in this 
setting.
22
 That is crucial to bear in mind in interpreting Bland, on which today’s consensus 
regarding the exclusion of loss of view from the protection of the enjoyment of land offered 
by nuisance largely rests. The crux of the complaint in Bland was that the defendant’s newly 
built dwelling plunged the claimant’s into ‘terrible darkness’; the house became like a 
‘dungeon’.
23
 Though loss of view is alluded to in Wray’s speech, there no mention of the 
character of the view that the defendant’s property obscured, including whether it was 
pleasing and, if so, how. The ‘how?’ question is particularly pertinent, because it directs 
attention to the limited accessibility of scenery from Tudor dwellings, owing to window 
glazing being too opaque to reveal pleasing scenery; glazed windows let in light but did not 
afford a clear view of the world outside.
24
  
It is therefore extremely doubtful that the exclusion from nuisance law of liability for 
an injured view has anything to do with ratio of Bland. Even so, it seems inescapable that the 
notion of injury to light and to prospect having profoundly different legal significance 
accorded well with judicial opinion at the time. The prevailing opinion was that nuisance law 
protected only those aspects of property that are essential to enjoyment in all cases, such as 
some light. In contrast: 
 
for prospect, which is a matter only of delight, and not of necessity, no action lies for 
stopping thereof, and yet it is a great commendation of a house if it has a long and 
large prospect.
25
 
 
                                                           
19
 Ibid, Case No 305. 
20 Ibid, Case No 312. 
21
 On linguistic issues in the context of early modern case law, see generally M Lobban, ‘Introduction: the Tools 
and Tasks of the Legal Historian’, in A Lewis and M Lobban, Law and History (Oxford University Press 2004) 
3-4.  
22
 J Loengard, ‘Common Law and Custom: Windows, Light and Privacy in Late Medieval England’, in S Jencks, 
J Rose, C Whittick (eds) Laws, Lawyers, Text (Brill 2012) 279, 287. 
23
 Bland, n 2. 
24
 On early modern glazing and its limited role in furnishing residential comforts, see: C Woolgar, The Senses in 
Late Medieval England (Yale University Press 2006) 63; Caroline Barron, London in the Middle Ages (OUP 
2004) 251; and J E Crowley, The Invention of Comfort: Sensibilities and Design in Early Modern Britain (John 
Hopkins University Press 2001), 61-68. In poorer Tudor dwellings, windows were not glazed but covered by 
linen cloth (Woolgar 73). Clear glazing was invented in the late seventeenth century: H Louw and R Crayford, 
‘A Constructional History of the Sash Window, c 1670-1725’ (1998) 41 Architectural History 82. On the 
transformation of landscape architecture accompanying this technological change, see R Williams, The Country 
and the City (Oxford University Press 1973) Ch 12 (entitled ‘Pleasing Prospects’). 
25 See above n 2, as reproduced in Aldred’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep f57b; (1610) 77 ER 816 660. 
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Coke cited this approvingly in Aldred’s Case.
26
 Likewise, William Blackstone wrote of a 
‘fine prospect’ being a ‘mere pleasure’ as opposed to ‘an indispensable requisite to every 
dwelling’.
27
  
Wray, Coke and indeed Blackstone were operating within a philosophical-legal milieu 
dominated by natural law theory, which was at the height of its influence in Tudor/Stuart 
times, but on the wane come the age of Blackstone.
28
 Natural law in this setting framed the 
question of the scope of actionable injury in terms of rational deduction from a fixed premise 
in the judicially-defined ‘natural necessities’ of land. As stated by Coke, these are wholesome 
air (salubritas aeris), minimum light (neccesitas luminis), and a catch-all sense of basic 
habitability (habitato hominis). A pleasing view is axiomatically not essential to land’s 
habitability, being a matter of delight (delectatio inhabitantis). Looking briefly ahead to later 
in the analysis, this approach came under strain in an increasingly bourgeois society, where 
individualism found expression in suburbs built upon the pillars of delight and respectability.  
Remaining with the early modern period, and sticking with the necessity/delight 
dichotomy, a conundrum thrown up by Bland concerns the premium placed on pleasing views 
by the contemporary landed establishment.
29
 Royalty and aristocracy invested substantially in 
properties having spectacular outlooks over delightful surroundings. Writing today, the 
architectural historian Oliver Creighton gives a number of examples.
30
 One is Kenilworth 
Castle, whose occupants enjoyed ‘sitting windows’ designed to look onto thoughtfully 
landscaped grounds (notably a large ornamental mere).
31
 The royal palace at Clarendon had 
female bedchambers, each with a window that opened onto an intimate view of an attractive 
private garden.
32
 Windsor Castle contained numerous rooms with expansive views over, 
variously, pleasure gardens, the deer park, hamlets and villages.
33
 Pleasing views in these 
settings served an important dual function. As well as being delightful to the eye, and thus of 
intrinsic aesthetic value, a room with a view positioned the proprietor at the apex of society. 
34
 
In practice, however, the elite was not prejudiced by Wray’s obiter dictum. Elite 
estates were of such extensive territorial reach that proprietors had almost complete mastery 
of the scenery viewable from the principal dwellings, and did not tend to fear the ‘spoiling’ 
                                                           
26
 Ibid. See further R Monson, E Plowden, C Wray, J Manwood, A Briefe Declaration For What manner of 
speciall Nusance concerning private dwelling Houses (Holborne 1639). 
27 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford University Press 1752), Book III, Ch 3.  
28
 On the ‘heyday’ of natural law thinking in early modern England, see D Ibbetson, ‘Natural Law and Common 
Law (2001) 5 Edin L R 4. See further Coquillette, above n, 17, 769-773. 
29
 On the importance of the landed elite to the development of the common law see J Getzler, 'Theories of 
Property and Economic Development'(1996) 26 The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 639. See in the context 
of nuisance law Pontin, above n 11, 1011. 
30
 O H Creighton, ‘Seeing is Believing: Looking Out on Medieval Castle Landscapes’ (2011) 14 Concillium 
Medii Aevi 79.  
31
 Creighton, ibid, 85. 
32 Ibid 80. 
33
 Ibid, 85. 
34
 ‘In the middle ages an elevated view over the landscape was something special and unusual, to be experienced 
by the privileged minority’ (ibid 80-81).  According to Raymond Williams, the landed aristocracy lavished 
fortunes on landscape improvement, as an exemplar of ‘elevated sensibility’ which justified this rank’s elite 
place within society (n 25, 121). 
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acts or omissions of neighbours.
35
  Rather, the main threat to a beautiful outlook came from 
insiders – i.e. tenants of the estate, who were minded to remove, say, an attractive tree-lined 
vista. Protection of pleasing prospects in this setting was secured through the law of waste.
36
 
In Packington’s Case,
37
 the Lord Chancellor (Lord Hardwicke) ruled that a tenant for life who 
sought to destroy a sylvan landscape could be restrained by the reversioner. Similarly, in 
Aston’s Case,
38
 the same judge likened a tenant’s attempt to destroy a picturesque tree lined 
view from the family mansion to the destruction of the mansion itself (granting an injunction 
prohibiting the waste). The early modern establishment thus protected pleasing views broadly 
adequately in an area of common law adjacent to nuisance. 
  
3. Nineteenth Century Modernisation in Actionable Nuisance: Understanding the 
Suburban Origins of ‘Sensible Personal Discomfort’ 
 
Some of the extensive tort scholarship dealing with nuisance law during the industrial 
revolution treats the law as undergoing significant changes in response to the emergence of 
the industrial bourgeoisie – a theme which I examine in this section in connection with the 
modern fate of Bland.
39
 One of the earliest analyses of this kind is Joel Brenner’s.
40
 His 
argument is that English courts applied nuisance law generously to wealth generating 
industrial polluters, sending out a clear signal that pollution in seats of industry was an 
acceptable price to pay for the material benefits of industrialisation. Brenner attributes 
particular significance to Lord Westbury’s judgment in Tipping:  
 
If a man lives in a town, it is necessary that he should subject himself to the 
consequences of those operations of trade which may be carried on in his immediate 
locality.
41
  
 
In this dictum, Lord Westbury is justifying why an action for ‘sensible personal discomfort’ 
must be determined with reference to the character of the neighbourhood, with townsfolk 
expected to tolerate ‘consequences’ (discomforts) that others are not. Lord Hoffmann (in 
Hunter) commented that Lord Westbury here ‘drew the line beyond which rural and landed 
England did not have to accept external costs imposed upon it by industrial pollution’.
42
 
However, Brenner’s emphasis is less on the interests of the landed establishment and more on 
those of the new middle classes, and rightly, I argue, at least in connection with the topic at 
hand. 
                                                           
35 Cf the reliance placed on nuisance law during industrialisation: Pontin, above n 11, 1017-18. 
36
 See generally J Franey, ‘A New History of Waste Law: How a Misunderstood Doctrine Shaped Ideas about 
the Transformation of Law’ (2015) Washington & Lee Legal Studies Research Paper Series, at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2673652##. 
37
 Packington v Layton (1744) 3 Atk 215. See too Aston v Aston (1749) 1 Ves Sen 264. 
38 Ibid 266. 
39
 Above n 2. 
40
 Above n 11.  
41
 Tipping 650. Brenner comments that this was ‘discriminatory’ against the urban proletariat (Brenner, n 11, 
415).  
42 Hunter 705. 
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 As with any class-deterministic account of the development of the common law, 
regard must be had to Richard Epstein’s cautionary argument that people with the wealth to 
litigate tort law do not necessarily have a zero sum interest in either a ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ 
provision.
43
  As a rule of thumb, a wealthy person is as likely to be a victim as a perpetrator of 
a tort. This applies specifically to the present subject matter (I argue), insofar as the Victorian 
era bourgeoisie sought from the common law both a narrow and a broad definition of 
actionable nuisance. They sought a narrow definition from the perspective of residents of 
manufacturing districts, who ‘subjected themselves’ to some pollution (Brenner’s argument), 
but they sought a broad definition in the suburban neighbourhoods built for them on the 
outskirts of seats of industry (something that is overlooked in Brenner’s analysis, but is 
supportive of his core thesis). Interestingly, social historians characterise suburbs as a new 
type of neighbourhood, where paramount importance was attributed to ‘artistic beauty’, 
‘display’, ‘tranquility’ and ‘gentility’.
44
 They were, it is said, ‘an instrument of moral, 
aesthetic and sanitary improvement [and] – a least at the beginning – of class segregation’.
45
   
 Brenner’s analysis of common law change does not deal with this aspect of the law’s 
socio-economic context, nor indeed does it acknowledge that change took place at a doctrinal 
level. Brenner prefers to locate change at a less formal level of the law's application (de facto 
rather than de jure).
46
 This makes him a unwitting contributor to Sugarman’s textbook 
tradition. Sugarman’s argument is that Victorian era English legal academics emphasised the 
permanent character of the common law, contained in fundamental principles. This, 
Sugarman claims, was motivated by a nascent disciplinary goal of establishing law as a 
subject worthy of university study, against the backdrop of an intellectual climate in which 
the common law was apt to be treated as too changeable, even chaotic. Brenner of course does 
not have that aim, but the emphasis on what he calls nuisance law’s ‘semantic continuity’ as 
between pre-industrial and industrial periods closely corresponds to Sugarman’s ‘tradition’. 
 Sugarman’s thesis is not wholly shared by William Twining,
47
  who points to the work 
of Dicey, together with professor of common law Frederick Pollock,
48
 to highlight a more 
dynamic scholarly conception of common law doctrine. Certainly, Pollock, in the preface to 
the fourth edition of Law of Torts, explicitly adopted the ‘living law’ paradigm similar to that 
popularised across the Atlantic by Holmes. He applauded the work of a selection of 
modernising English judges.
49
 More generally, Dicey wrote of ‘judicial legislation’ in terms 
that merit rather extensive quotation, with Brenner’s analysis in mind: 
                                                           
43
 R Epstein, ‘Social Consequences of Common Law Rules’ (1982) Harvard L R 1717, 1719  
44
 L Davidoff and C Hall, ‘The Architecture of Public and Private Life: English Middle Class Society in a 
Provincial Town’, in D Fraser and A Sutcliffe (eds), The Pursuit of Urban History (Edward Arnold 1983) 327, 
331. On the emergence of suburbia and its links to the bourgeoisie, see D Cannadine, Lords and Landlords: The 
Aristocracy and the Towns 1774-1967 (1980 Leicester University Press); K Theodore Hoppen, The Mid 
Victorian Generation: 1846-1886  (Oxford University Press 2000)= 334-336; and G Davidson, ‘The Suburban 
Idea and its Enemies’ (2013) 39 Journal of Urban History 829. 
45
 Davison (ibid 835). 
46 Brenner, 409.  
47
 W Twining, above n 6, and ‘Two Works of Karl Llewellyn’ (1967) 30 Modern Law Review 514. 
48
 F Pollock, The Law of Torts, 4
th
 edn (Stevens and Sons 1895). 
49
 Pollock singled out Lords Blackburn and Bramwell and Mr Justice Willes, who rejected an ahistorical (what 
Pollock called ‘black letter law’) approach to tort, in favour of one in which the ‘fire’ of modernity burned (ibid, 
vii). Pollock does not mention modernisers addressed in my analysis below, namely, Mr Justice Byles, Lord 
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Nor let anyone imagine that judicial legislation is a kind of law making which belongs wholly 
to the past…New combinations of circumstances—that is, new cases—constantly call for the 
application, which means in truth the extension of old principles; or, it may be, even for the 
thinking out of some new principle, in harmony with the general spirit of the law, fitted to 
meet the novel requirements of the time. Hence whole branches not of ancient but of very 
modern law have been built up, developed, or created by the action of the Courts.50 
 
However, Dicey did not elaborate on this in relation to nuisance law, nor did Pollock.  
Indeed, there is thus a noticeable gap between Pollock’s rhetoric of living law in the 
context of tort and his dry and banal exposition of the nuts and bolts of nuisance law.
51
 The 
problem with Pollock’s (and later Brenner’s) exposition of nuisance law is that it gives no 
sense of the reality of a distinctively modern law emerging as to the nature of actionable 
injury. They thus neglect the divergence of judicial opinion about the definition of nuisance 
evident most notably in three cases concerning brickworks odours: Walter v Selfe,
52
 Hole v 
Barlow,
53
 and Bamford v Turnley.
54
 The judicial disagreement, I argue, crystallised around 
the extent to which a nuisance must have some physicality. Understanding this is crucial to a 
grasp of the significance of Lord Westbury’s intervention in Tipping, which introduced an 
explicitly non-physical head of actionable nuisance, departing in so doing from the old idea 
that nuisance protected only the prerequisites of every dwelling. This is living law in action as 
per Pollock the common law theorist, rather than Pollock the nuts and bolts tort commentator. 
 
Injured Sensibility in London’s Victorian Suburbs – the Brickworks Trilogy 
 
A distinctively modern feature of the cases concerning brickworks under scrutiny, leading up 
to Tipping, is that they were each brought by a claimant from London’s new suburbs, in 
respect of odours that were unpleasant without being harmful to health or otherwise 
‘physically’ damaging.
55
 The suburban character of the claim in Walter is gleaned from the 
reference in the report to the claimant owning a property in Surbiton, on which had been 
‘spen[t] considerable sums of money…on the garden, lawn and pleasure ground [in] 
rendering the same habitable and fit for residence by a respectable tenant’.
56
 The claimant in 
Hole occupied a property in an unnamed West London suburb,
57
 whilst the claimant in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Westbury and grandfather Chief Baron Pollock. On Professor Pollock’s multifaceted contribution to legal 
scholarship, see N Duxbury, Frederick Pollock and the English Juristic Tradition (OUP 2004). 
50
 A V Dicey, Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth 
Century (2
nd
 ed, Macmillan 1905) 258. 
51Law of Torts, Ch 10.  
52
 N 8  above. 
53
 N 9 above.  
54
 N 10 above.  
55
 On the growth of London suburbia in the nineteenth century, see D A Reeder, ‘A Theatre of Suburbs: Some 
Patterns of Development in West London 1808-1911’, in H J Dyos (ed), The Study of Urban History (Edward 
Arnold 1968) 253.  
56
 Ibid, 316. Surbiton, in Surrey, is described by one social historian as ‘the classic Victorian suburb’ (C French, 
‘Who Lived in Suburbia? Surbiton in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century’ (2007) 10 Family and 
Community History  93). 
57 Counsel stated that the ‘circumstances’ were similar to those in Walter (Hole 1116).   
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Bamford v Turnley owned a ‘splendid’ villa within the ‘beautiful’ Beulah Spa estate, recently 
constructed on enclosed common land in Norwood, south of the city.
58
  
The central legal issue in Walter v Selfe was whether common law nuisance remedied 
injury to a proprietor’s sensibility. The defendant said not, asserting that it is ‘not mere 
offensiveness of a smell that will entitle a neighbour to an injunction’.
59
 Rather, the smell 
must be ‘injurious to health’, or at least ‘unwholesome’.
60
 Though Knight Bruce VC found 
for the claimant, his reasoning is hard to follow, because it frames the actionability of an 
odour in unconvincing terms of physicality:  
 
ought this inconvenience to be considered in fact as more than fanciful, more than one 
of mere delicacy or fastidiousness, as an inconvenience materially interfering with the 
ordinary comfort physically of human existence, not merely according to elegant or 
dainty modes and habits of living, but according to plain and sober and simple notions 
among the English people?
61
 
 
In Law of Torts, Pollock endorsed this passage as an accurate encapsulation of the definition 
of actionable nuisance,
 62
 adding that it rightly excluded ‘loss of amenity’.
63
  
Pollock’s analysis is difficult to sustain.  This is principally because it ignores the 
difficulty of reconciling Knight Bruce’s statement in this case with Lord Westbury’s speech 
in Tipping, which provided for actionable non-physical injury, now generally known as 
‘amenity nuisance’.
64
 It cannot be ruled out that Pollock was exercising a censorial role here, 
to the effect that he was championing Knight Bruce’s approach as correct, and discouraging 
adherence to Lord Westbury’s incautiously expansive remarks about the possibility of remedy 
for injury to sensibility independent of physicality. Be that as it may, the crucial point is that 
Pollock does not accurately expound on the law of the day here.
65
 
The beginning of the end of the requirement of physicality, which I suggest is central 
to an understanding of the shift away from the dictum of Wray in Bland, is Hole. This case is 
best known today for Byles’ ruling that nuisance occasioned by a suitably located trade, 
conducted in a reasonable manner, is not actionable. Present day commentary is largely 
                                                           
58
 Bamford 26. On the suburban context, see J Coulter, ‘Norwood: Common Land to City Commuters’, August 
2002 (Ideal Homes: A History of South East London Suburbs - http://www.ideal-homes.org.uk/case-
studies/norwood). 
59 Walter, n 10, 319. 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 Ibid 322 [emphasis added]. 
62
 Pollock, above n 48, 366. 
63
 Ibid. 
64 As one leading present day commentator write, ‘The classic private nuisance case focuses on interference with 
the amenity of property’ (M Lee, ‘What is Private Nuisance?’ (2003) 109 LQR 298). 
65
 From a present day perspective too it is telling that a century and half on, quotations from Walter omit any 
mention of injury being limited in terms of materiality and physicality. For instance, as well as the point made by 
Lee above (ibid), the requirement of physicality is omitted from Carnwath LJ’s précis of Knight Bruce VC’s 
speech in Barr v Biffa Waste Services Ltd [2012] 3 WLR 795, 805, as requiring ‘real interference with the 
comfort or convenience of living, according to the standards of the average man’. On Pollock’s mixed record of 
anticipating the future development of the common law, see Duxbury, n 49, 249 (‘Odd though it may seem, it is 
because [The Law of] Torts is so unswervingly focused upon principles that it has little legal relevance today; 
the law of tort has changed so much…’). This part of the article addresses contemporary inaccuracies in 
Pollock’s exposition. 
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critical of this, and in particular, what is said to be the unduly industry-sympathetic policy 
behind the locality test, namely, to avoid ‘great injury of the manufacturing and social 
interests of the community’.
66
  However, this policy is surely sound when situated in the 
context of a claim for injury to sensibility, as indeed it must be because of the facts of the 
case.
67
 The defendant had argued, as per Walter, that an unpleasant smell was not actionable 
absent materiality or physicality. Byles dispensed with this requirement, ruling that ‘it is 
enough if it [the nuisance] renders the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable’.
68
  He 
reigned in the potentially broad scope of this ruling through the pragmatic remark that the 
actionability of discomfort is relative to the character of the neighbourhood. 
These differences in the formulation of actionable injury in Walter and Hole are 
reflected in the divided Court of Exchequer in Bamford v Turnley, where opinion differed as 
to which of the approaches of Knight Bruce and Byles was correct. The majority of the Court 
(Pollock CB dissenting) departed from Byles’ ruling in Hole. Williams J (on behalf of Erle 
and Keating JJ, and Wilde B)
69
 denied that the character of the neighbourhood ever had 
anything to do with actionability in nuisance. The correct position was simple and well 
established: i.e. an ‘annoyance’ is either ‘sufficiently great’ to be actionable universally (i.e. 
regardless of locality), or it is not actionable at all.
70
 The sense of continuity with the early 
modern case law noted in the previous section is apparent in the statement that: 
 
a man may, without being liable to an action, exercise a lawful 
trade…notwithstanding it be carried on so near the house of another as to be an 
annoyance to him, in rendering his residence there less delectable or agreeable.
71
  
 
This is the approach of Wray, Coke and Blackstone. 
By contrast, the Court of Exchequer’s chief judge, Sir (Jonathan) Frederick Pollock,
72
 
broadly favoured the approach taken by Byles in Hole. He propounded a flexible definition of 
actionable nuisance that moved beyond the necessity-pleasure dichotomy of an earlier, 
simpler society:   
 
The question so entirely depends on the surrounding circumstances,—the place where, 
the time when, the alleged nuisance, what, the mode of committing it, how, and the 
duration of it, whether temporary or permanent, occasional or continual,—as to make 
it impossible to lay down any rule of law applicable to every case, and which will also 
be useful in assisting a jury to come to a satisfactory conclusion:—it must at all times 
be a question of fact with reference to all the circumstances of the case.73  
 
                                                           
66
 Hole 1113. For criticism see Brenner (above n 11, 411), and McLaren (above n 11, 172). 
67
 Pontin, above n 11. 
68 Hole 1114. 
69
 Bramwell B delivered a separate concurring speech alongside that of Williams J (Bamford, 32-33). 
70
 Ibid 31. 
71
 Bamford 30 [emphasis added].  
72
 Sir Frederick Pollock (1783-1870) was the grandfather of Sir Frederick Pollock the common law scholar. 
73 Bamford 31. 
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The explicit modernity of this is captured by Pollock’s reference to ‘actions which nobody in 
Westminster Hall dreamed of [being brought within nuisance law] as we become more 
familiar with the exigencies of society’.
74
  
   
Tipping and the Emergence of ‘Sensible Personal Discomfort’  
 
Despite Professor Pollock’s ambivalence towards the case, Tipping has come to be 
understood as the leading authority on nuisance, laying the foundations of the law today. As 
explained by Brian Simpson,
75
 Tipping was a painstakingly and expensively constructed test 
case brought by wealthy parties aimed at resolving the confusion arising from the Hole and 
Bamford rulings. Of the various speeches of their Lordships, attention has centred on that of 
Lord Westbury, the Lord Chancellor within Viscount Palmerston’s cabinet. Tipping was the 
final judgment of his career – his ‘swansong’
76
 – but Simpson’s analysis is critical. The 
problem (so Simpson suggested) is that Lord Westbury’s distinction between physical and 
non-physical injury is ‘sloppy’, in two ways.
77
 First, it fails to define material or physical 
injury (actionable absolutely). Second, it resurrects the ‘ghost’ of Hole, in making so-called 
‘sensible personal discomfort’ actionable subject to the character of the neighbourhood.
78
  
 This misses the point that the central issue in Hole (and indeed all the bricksworks 
cases) was the actionability of injured sensibility, independent of physicality. It also neglects 
the care that Lord Westbury took to define actionable ‘sensible personal discomfort’. It is 
defined as ‘anything that discomposes or injuriously affects the senses or the nerves’.
79
 At 
face value, the reference to ‘anything’ encompasses the senses of smell, hearing, taste and 
sight (and, with less obvious application) touch. On this reading, Lord Westbury’s judgment 
in Tipping is an ingenious  stroke of modernity, which recognises that the time has arrived for 
injured sensibility to fall within the scope of nuisance law, and for the necessity-delight 
dichotomy to be softened, if not abandoned entirely, in order to do so. Crucially, it breaks 
away from the old architecture through which nuisance law previously protected only the 
universal necessities of land’s enjoyment.  
Shortly after Tipping, the judgment in Crump v Lambert
80
 dispelled any sense that the 
novel heading of sensible personal discomfort might evolve into a ‘second class’ form of 
actionable nuisance. The case concerned noise from a blast furnace on the outskirts of a 
midlands industrial centre, which the defendant submitted ought in equity be treated 
differently from a case involving physical injury (vibration); an injunction should not be 
granted for mere discomfort. The court rejected this, ruling that sensible personal discomfort, 
where out of character with the neighbourhood, was no less substantial by virtue of its lack of 
                                                           
74
 Bamford, 28). On Pollock’s modern style of legal reasoning, in response to social exigency, see J M Rigg, ‘Sir 
(Jonathan) Frederick Pollock’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004). Pollock was ‘more concerned 
to achieve substantive justice in the instant case than to knit the strands of common law into a coherent pattern’. 
75
 A W B Simpson, Leading Cases in the Common Law (OUP 1995) 187-189 
76 R Cocks, ‘Richard Bethell: first Baron Westbury (1800-1873), Lord Chancellor’ (2004) Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography (http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/2305). 
77
 Leading Cases 189.  
78
 Ibid. 
79
 Tipping 650. 
80 (1867) LR 3 Eq 409. 
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physicality, and merited the award of an injunction. This was the first in a long line of 
injunctions awarded under Lord Westbury’s sensible personal discomfort heading.  
What, though, of any cases in which explicit recognition is given to Tipping as a case 
that modernised the law, by departing from the necessity-delight dichotomy of old? In an 
easement-focused case, Angus v Dalton,
81
 Lord Blackburn impugned the rule in Bland as out-
dated:  
 
The distinction between a right to light and a right to prospect, on the grounds that one 
is a matter of necessity whereas the other of delight, is to my mind more quaint than 
satisfactory.
82
  
 
What exactly is out-dated here is not made clear, and to imply that it is a reference to Tipping 
and its wider legal and social context is pure guesswork. But that does not lessen the 
significance of this negative treatment of Bland by a distinguished law lord. Surprisingly, 
Angus is portrayed as supportive of the permanence of Bland.
83
  
  
4. Reasons for the Permanence of the ‘Rule in Bland’? 
 
This section identifies and evaluates the reasons given for the enduring validity of Wray’s 
analysis, as per the consensus. As noted at the outset, the veracity of the consensus is largely 
considered self evident – it is clear or obvious, and reasons beyond this do not much come 
into the picture. Nevertheless, drawing on fragments of scholarly and judicial material –
including within the wider common law world – it is possible to identify six purported 
rationales:  
 
(i) ‘Sensible personal discomfort’ does not engage the sense of sight; 
(ii)  Discomfort is not an aesthetic criterion; 
(iii)  An injured view is not an emanation from land; 
(iv)  A proprietor wishing to protect a pleasing view can adequately do so through 
agreeing a restrictive covenant with their neighbour; 
(v)  The protection of pleasing views over and above covenants is better secured 
through planning regulation;  
(vi)  Excluding injured views is necessary to control the floodgates of litigation. 
 
These are examined in turn.  
 
‘Sensible Personal Discomfort’ Does Not Engage the Sense of Sight 
 
                                                           
81 (1880 – 81) L.R. 6 App. Cas. 740, HL. 
82
 Angus, 820. 
83
 Lord Blackburn stated that a right to a view or prospect could not be acquired prescriptively. The reason is that 
a right to a view acquired through long user would ‘impose a burden on a very large and indefinite area’ (Angus 
824). This is cited in Hunter as a reason for excluding such injury from sounding in nuisance. However, it is 
respectfully submitted that it is specific to prescription and easements. 
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This was addressed by the Court of Appeal in Thompson Schwab.
84
 The discomforting sight 
at the centre of this case was a Mayfair brothel, which the claimant considered offensive. One 
of the defence arguments was to challenge the suggestion that ‘sensible personal discomfort’ 
encompassed indecent sights. Finding for the claimant, Lord Evershed said of the defendant’s 
activities: 
 
 
It does not, to my mind, follow at all that their [the defendant] activities should be 
regarded as free from the risk or possibility that they cause a nuisance in the proper 
sense of that term to a neighbour merely because they do not impinge upon the senses 
– for example the nose or the ear – as would the emanation of a smell or a noise.
85
 
 
This was strongly supported, with helpful elaboration, by the author of the case note in the 
Law Quarterly Review: ‘As it is clear that anything which is obnoxious to the senses of 
hearing and smelling may constitute a nuisance, it would be astonishing if the sense of seeing 
should be regarded as excluded’.
86
  
  Thompson Schwab is an important case that is returned to below in connection with a 
further rationale for the consensus (in regard to the ‘requirement’ of an emanation from land). 
Staying with the point at hand, it is pertinent to acknowledge two other English claims in 
which injuries to the sense of sight have been held actionable in principle, namely, Cook v 
South West Water Services,
87
 and Hughes v South West Water.
88
 Each concerns pollution of 
rivers spoiling their look, in aesthetic terms (rather than in terms of public 
morality/indecency). In Cook, the judge found (on the basis of photographic evidence) that 
foam and algae caused by discharges of sewage from the defendant’s works ‘defac[ed] the 
beauty of the river in its progress through delightful countryside.’
89
 The claim succeeded on 
this basis. Similarly, in Hughes, sewage pollution amounted to nuisance by virtue of ‘the 
visual effect of the algal blooms, the unpleasantness of bringing in tackle with green slime on 
it’.
90
 These county court cases are persuasive in principle, if not of course binding. 
 
Discomfort is not an ‘aesthetic criterion’ 
 
Writing in the 1940s, Cecil Fifoot asserted that ‘a householder cannot in nuisance complain if 
his outlook is spoilt [because]…comfort, and not aesthetics, offer[s] the criterion’.
91
  The 
pollution cases above are a challenge to that analysis, but some support for this can be found 
in the United States case law. For example, in the Missouri case of Ness,
92
 the plaintiff 
complained of unsightly rubbish (rusted metal, broken concrete, old sinks and stoves) dumped 
in the neighbouring yard.  The Missouri Court of Appeals denied the claim: 
                                                           
84
 Thompson Schwab v Costaki [1956] 1 WLR 335. This was followed in Laws and others v Florinplace Ltd 
(1981) 1 All ER 659 
85
 Thompson Schwab 338. 
86
 Anon, (1956) 72 LQR 315  [emphasis added].  
87 Exeter County Court, 15 April, 1992 (transcript on file with author). 
88
 Llangefni County Court, 21 June 1995 (transcript on file with author). 
89
 Above n 87. 
90
 However, the defence of statutory authority applied, and this claim did not succeed. 
91
 C J Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law: Tort and Contract (Stevens and Sons 1947) 95. 
92 Ness v Albert 665 S.W.2d 1 (1983).   
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Aesthetic considerations are fraught with subjectivity…beauty is in the eye of the 
beholder. Judicial forage into such a nebulous area would be chaotic. Any imaginary 
good from doing so is far outweighed by the lurking danger of unduly circumscribing 
inherent rights of ownership of property and grossly intimidating their lawful exercise. 
This court has no inclination to knowingly infuse the law with such rampant 
uncertainty.
93
 
 
Perhaps the most recent illustration of this approach is the Vermont Supreme Court’s refusal 
this year, in the case of Myrick, to overturn late nineteenth century state authority to the effect 
that an unsightly use of land is not actionable in the absence of malice.
94
 One of the reasons 
given for the outcome of Myrick was that visual aesthetic nuisance is ‘unquantifiable’.  
This is not however the consensus position across the US federation, for there is 
significant variation on this point between the various US states. Some states go as far as to 
remedy an ugly land use when accompanied by more established actionable discomforts (e.g. 
noise or smell).  Thus in Sowers, the defendant’s plans for a wind turbine were injuncted on 
the basis of ugliness and noise; pure ugliness would not have been sufficient.
95
 Sometimes 
state judges have gone further in recognising the soundness of a claim where the unpleasant 
sight of the defendant’s activities is the claim’s sole basis. An early and oft-noted example is 
Virginian case of Parkersburg Builders Material Company v Barrack (another case 
concerning nuisance unsightly scrap in a residential area).
96
  Judge Maxwell stated that:  
 
Happily, the day has arrived when persons may entertain appreciation of the aesthetic 
and be heard in equity [and common law] in vindication of their love of the 
beautiful…Basically, this is because a thing visually offensive may seriously affect 
the residents of a community in the reasonable enjoyment of their homes.
97
 
This approach was taken in the Colorado case of Allison v Smith – another scrap case.
98
  
Judge Metzger stated that the unsightly scrap could amount to a nuisance, insofar as it 
amounted to an unreasonable and substantial interference with the enjoyment of land. It did 
not matter that the scrap was not smelly or noisy. Being a source of discomfort was enough. 
                                                           
93
 Ibid. 
94 Myrick v. Peck Elec. Co., 2017 VT 4 (in respect of Woodstock Burying Ground Assoc’n v Hager 68 Vt 488, 35 
A 431 (1896)). 
95
 Sowers v Forest Hills Subdivision 129 Nev Advance Opinion 9 (2013). The injunction was granted on the 
basis of a combination of noise nuisance, ‘flicker’, and aesthetic injury, but it was made clear that the latter alone 
would have been insufficient ((‘aesthetics alone cannot form the basis of a private nuisance action’).  
96 118 W. Va. 608, 191 S.E. 368 (1937). See similarly State ex rel Carter v Harper (1923) 182 Wis. 148, 159, 
196 N.W. 451, 455 (‘As a race, our sensibilities are becoming more refined and that which formerly did not 
offend cannot now be endured … nauseous smells have always come under the ban of the law, but ugly sights 
and discordant surroundings may be just as distressing to keener sensibilities’.) 
97
 Ibid. 
98 Allison v Smith 695 P.2d, 791, 794 (1984) 
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In this respect, the judge rightly described the scope of actionable discomfort as ‘inclusive’.
99
 
That approach appears to have academic support.
100
 
 However, it is in the South African case of Waterhouse Properties
101
 that Lord 
Westbury’s dictum in Tipping finds some of its clearest expression. The complaint concerned 
obstruction of a view of a ‘pretty river’ by the raising of the defendant’s roof. It was argued 
by the claimant that the injury was actionable because the view was integral to the enjoyment 
of their property, which was located in a ‘pretty’ and ‘exclusive’ neighbourhood. The court 
agreed (per Justice Rampai):  
 
If we accept and I believe we should, that we are here dealing with an extraordinary 
situation of two neighbouring properties with unique attributes, developed in a highly 
exclusive area on the pretty bank of a splendid river which is the soul of everything in 
the rich men’s playground – then we must appreciate, and acknowledge that to a 
reasonable and neutral property owner in that particular society a view of the river in 
question is much more than a pure aesthetic matter.  It is an asset with unquestionable 
proprietary significance.
102
  
 
Whilst the judge rejected the actionability of ‘pure aesthetic loss’, he accepted that the loss of 
aesthetic value was discomforting, whereby it derived its proprietary significance. 
Returning to Fifoot’s point in the context of English and wider common law world 
case law, the difficulty is that it is precisely because comfort is the criterion that aesthetic-
based loss is in principle actionable. In plenty of cases comfort and aesthetics are closely 
intertwined. The cases noted in the previous sections illustrate this, perhaps above all 
Bamford v Turnley, in which there were multiple layers of aesthetic consideration at play – 
the pleasing look of the property, the unpleasant (but not unhealthy) smell in particular.
103
 Yet 
the parties in this dispute did not (as Fifoot in the quote above does) seek to distinguish 
between aesthetics and comfort.  
                                                           
99
 Ibid 
100
 Beginning with D Noel, ‘Unaesthetic Sights as Nuisances (1939) 25 Cornell Law Quarterly 1, and including 
more recently R Coletta,  ‘Case for Aesthetic Nuisance: Rethinking Traditional Judicial Attitudes (1987) 48 
Ohio St L J 141,G Smith and G Fernandez, ‘The Price of Beauty: An Economic Approach to Aesthetic 
Nuisance’ (1991) 15 Harvard Environmental Law Review 53; R Dodson, ‘Rethinking Private Nuisance Law: 
Recognizing Aesthetic Nuisances in the New Millennium’ (2002) 10 South Carolina Environmental Law 
Journal 1. 
101
 Above n 13. 
102
 Ibid 34 
103 Note further the allusions to aesthetic considerations in Pollock speech in this case: 
 
That may be a nuisance in Grosvenor Square which would be none in Smithfield Market, that may be a 
nuisance at midday which would not be so at midnight, that may be a nuisance which is permanent and 
continual which would be no nuisance if temporary or occasional only. A clock striking the hour, or a 
bell ringing for some domestic purpose, may be a nuisance, if unreasonably loud and discordant... 
 
An ‘unreasonably...discordant’ sound is palpably ‘aesthetic’. More subtle is the Dickensian juxtaposition of the 
picturesque and relatively modern residential development (Grosvenor Square), and the insalubrious medieval 
market district (Smithfield). See C Dickens, Oliver Twist (Richard Bentley 1838), chapter 21 (of Smithfield it is 
written that a ‘hideous and discordant dim… resounded from every corner of the market; and the unwashed, 
unshaven, squalid, and dirty figures constantly running to and fro, and bursting in and out of the throng; rendered 
it a stunning and bewildering scene, which quite confounded the senses.)  
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Emanation from land 
 
It is said that normally a nuisance will take the form of an ‘emanation’ from the land of the 
defendant, which ‘invades’ the land of the neighbour. Lord Goff in Hunter mentioned that: 
 
more is required than the mere presence of a neighbouring building to give rise to an 
actionable private nuisance. Indeed, for an action in private nuisance to lie in respect 
of interference with the plaintiff's enjoyment of his land, it will generally arise from 
something emanating from the defendant's land.
104
 
 
This is a general requirement, but there are exceptions. As Lord Lloyd pointed out in this 
case, a nuisance can take the form of state of affairs.
105
 That is the form in which seemingly 
most of the successful impaired view cases from around the common law world have been 
presented. For example, in Sowers, the injunction prohibited ‘a significant imposition’ on the 
plaintiffs (taking the form of a 75ft wind turbine).
106
  The turbine risked imposing a ‘sizeable 
obstacle overshadowing’ the plaintiffs’ land, which could have an ‘impact on views’. The 
terms ‘impact’, ‘imposition’ and ‘overshadowing’ are not the same as ‘emanation’. The 
nuisance here takes the form of a state of affairs.
107
  
On the other hand, it is unclear that it is indeed necessary to depart from the rhetoric of 
emanation to cater the actionability of an offensive sight. In Thompson Schwab v Costaki
108
 
Lord Evershed used the language of emanation in stating that the defendant and their clientele 
‘force[d] themselves on the sense of sight’ of the neighbouring claimant and his family.
109
 It 
has been suggested by one commentator that ‘emanation’ is in this context being used 
metaphorically.
110
 But as light travels, a bad view can emanate literally, no less than a bad 
noise or smell. Yet pedantry aside, the state of affairs paradigm is advantageous, because it 
reinforces the non-physical nature of an injured view, and indeed of injured sensibilities more 
generally. 
 
Alternative Private Law Remedies 
 
Lord Lloyd in Hunter considered that a principal objection to nuisance law remedying an 
injured view is that a neighbour wishing to protect a pleasing view can adequately do so by 
means of a restrictive covenant:  
 
                                                           
104
 Hunter 686. 
105
 Hunter 700. 
106 Sowers, above n 95, 10. 
107
 For a leading English case of this form, see Bolton v Stone [1950] 1 KB 201, 208 (per Jenkins LJ), and 
earliest of all Bamford (66). 
108
 Above n 85.
  
109
 Ibid 339. 
110 W V H Rodgers, Winfield and Jolowicz, Tort (18th edn , Sweet and Maxwell 2010) 713. 
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The house-owner who has a fine view of the South Downs may find that his neighbour 
has built so as to obscure his view. But there is no redress, unless, perchance, the 
neighbour's land was subject to a restrictive covenant in the house-owner's favour.
111
  
 
A case that highlights the potential of this land law/contractual approach is Dennis v 
Davies.
112
 On facts similar to Waterhouse Properties (obstruction of a view over a pretty 
river, in this case the Thames), the claimant established that they suffered an ‘annoyance’ 
contrary to a covenant prohibiting a ‘nuisance or an annoyance’.  
Such wording in covenants is fairly standard practice, and thus Dennis may come to 
the aid of a considerable number of proprietors who, constrained by the consensus, are 
advised that an injured view does not sound in nuisance. But that begs the central question: 
what is the basis for treating a loss of view as at most an annoyance? Covenants and 
nuisances engage discrete areas of law, which converge from time to time without ever 
limiting one another. Nuisance law has an entirely distinctive normative basis. As explained 
well by Lord Millett, with nuisance the ‘governing principle is good neighbourliness…A 
landowner must show the same consideration for his neighbour as he would expect his 
neighbour to show for him’.
113
 Covenants deal with obligations that arise under contract.  
 
The Impact of Regulation 
 
Lord Hoffmann in Hunter stated that planning regulation was a more suitable forum within 
which to protect cherished views than a nuisance action: 
 
the planning system is, I think, a far more appropriate form of control, from the point 
of view of both the developer and the public, than enlarging the right to bring actions 
for nuisance at common law. It enables the issues to be debated before an expert 
forum at a planning inquiry and gives the developer the advantage of certainty as to 
what he is entitled to build.
114
 
 
Once again, the reference to ‘enlargement’ of actionable injury begs the central question at 
issue in this article (in which it is suggested that nuisance law might already protect against 
private injury to a pleasing view). But there are three further difficulties with Lord 
Hoffmann’s reasoning.  
First, a proprietor with the benefit of a pleasing view which they wish to protect from 
harmful development may not be permitted to have their objections taken into account by the 
planning authority. This is because loss of a private view is not normally a material 
consideration for purposes of statutory development control.
115
 Planning lawyers in this 
context tend to distinguish between a private interest in the pleasing view (not normally a 
                                                           
111
 Hunter 699. 
112
 [2009] EWCA Civ 1081. 
113
 Southwark LBC v Mills [2001] AC 1, 20. 
114
 Hunter 710  (‘It would be wrong to ‘create a new right of action’ which involves ‘changing the principles of 
nuisance law’).  
115
Stringer v MHLG  [1971] 1 All ER 65. See further  S Crow ‘What price a room with a view? Public interest, 
private interests and the Human Rights Act’ [2001] JPEL 1349.  
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material consideration) and the public interest in a pleasing ‘landscape’ (normally a material 
consideration). This is not the place to enter into a discussion of public law protection of 
landscapes. The point, rather, is that the planning system is not designed to resolve disputes 
between neighbours over private views, or indeed any other private law matter.
116
 
A second difficulty is that Hunter was decided before Coventry v Lawrence,
117
 in 
which the Supreme Court departed from Gillingham Borough Docks,
118
 on which Lord 
Hoffmann's remarks in Hunter are premised.
 
 In Gillingham, it was ruled that planning 
permission alters the character of the neighbourhood within which the actionability of 
sensible personal discomfort falls to be assessed.  But that is no longer the law, for in 
Coventry it was held that planning regulation and nuisance law are autonomous 
administrative and private law provisions, which co-exist in parallel (rather than the former 
cutting down or otherwise limiting the latter, or vice versa). Lord Hoffmann’s notion that 
planning control is ‘more appropriate’ than nuisance law in regard to the remedying of injured 
views did not anticipate the significant extent to which the two now operate in parallel. 
Finally, the Supreme Court in Coventry ruled that public interest considerations of the 
kind that occupied Lord Hoffmann come into play not so much through the door of liability 
but through the exercise of discretion regarding the award of equitable remedies, notably an 
injunction.
119
 Whilst planning permission no longer alters the character of the neighbourhood 
for purposes of nuisance liability, it may weigh in favour of a decision to award damages in 
lieu of an injunction.
120
 Ex hypothesi, were a wind turbine operator, on facts broadly similar 
to Sowers, be found liable in nuisance on the basis of sensible personal discomfort visually 
(or in any other sense), it is open to them to argue that equitable damages are a more 
appropriate remedy (say because it is not in the public interest to halt renewable energy 
generation which promotes statutory carbon budgets on the basis of an individual’s 
discomfort). 
 
 
Floodgates 
 
Both Lords Lloyd and Hoffmann in Hunter refer approvingly to Lord Hardwicke’s 
floodgates-style policy argument in Attorney General v Doughty.
121
 In this eighteenth century 
chancery appeal case the Lord Chancellor stated: 
 
I know no general rule of common law, which warrants that, or says, that building so 
as to stop another's prospect is a nuisance. Was that the case, there could be no great 
towns; and I must grant injunctions to all the new buildings in this town.
 122
 
 
                                                           
116
 S Tromans, ‘Planning and Environmental Law: Uneasy Bedfellows’ [2012] JPL OP73 (‘The planning system, 
unlike the law of nuisance, is not there to adjudicate between the competing interests of neighbours’). 
117 Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13 [189].  
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 Gillingham Borough Council v Medway Chatham Dock (1993) QB 343. 
119
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120
 Ibid.  
121
 (1752) 2 Ves Sen 453. 
122 Ibid, 453-454. 
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This is cited by some of the judges in Hunter as a justification for an injured view never 
sounding in nuisance.
123
 However, the passage above is more particularistic. It is to the effect 
that the ‘stopping’ of a view over another’s land is not generally actionable in ‘great towns’. 
As Lord Hardwicke says in this case: ‘There may be such a right as this’,
124
 such that the 
development proceeded ‘at its peril’.
125
  
Floodgates-based arguments are commonplace in the adjacent tort of negligence. 
However, nuisance law is different, because it has built into it an array of control devices 
which limit the need for ‘slippery slope’ argumentation of this sort. For example, there are 
quite tight limits on standing to sue, which summarily exclude something in the order of half 
the population from bringing a claim (at least in private nuisance). Additionally, there are 
other limits, such as the reasonable user criterion, the locality test, the de minimis damage 
rule, and the bar to a remedy for economic loss or – in private nuisance at least - personal 
injury, which further contain any flood of litigation.  Finally, there is discretion to withhold an 
injunction and award equitable damages, mentioned above.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Sometimes a broken view can be a very serious interference with the enjoyment of land, and 
indeed considerably more so than a broken window.
126
 The central argument in this article is 
that the consensus that an injured view is not in any circumstances remediable within the 
framework of nuisance law, following Bland, takes the idea of the permanence of the 
common law principles to an implausible extreme. Although this conclusion is supported by 
so-called contextual material, the overwhelming bulk of the analysis is classically formalistic, 
in its attention to doctrine.  The consensus lacks formal credibility because: (1) Bland is an 
unreported authority, and the doctrine of precedent provides special rules relating to the 
handling of such cases; (2) it is unclear that the exclusion of pleasing views is the ratio 
decidendi of Bland, insofar as Mr Bland may not have suffered, or indeed claimed to have 
suffered, loss to a pleasing view; (3) Bland has received a mixed judicial reception (e.g. it was 
criticised as old fashioned by Lord Blackburn in Angus v Dalton); (4) Bland is difficult to 
reconcile with subsequent English authority on the heads of actionable nuisance (notably 
Tipping, but also Thompson Schwab); (5) Bland has not been followed in case law on injured 
views in some legal systems elsewhere in the wider common law world.
127
 
                                                           
123
 By Lord Lloyd (699) and (in the Court of Appeal)  Pill LJ (668). 
124
 n 121 [emphasis added]. 
125 Ibid. In another of Lord Hardwicke’s judgments relevant to views, Fishmongers’ Company Ltd v East India 
Company Ltd (1752) 21 ER 232, the claim was for prospective loss of commercial rental income as a 
consequence of the impact of the planned warehouse on light and prospect enjoyed by the claimant’s commercial 
premises. The court accepted that the defendant’s development might reduce to property’s rental value, but that 
financial loss in these circumstances was not per se an actionable nuisance. For modern law on pure economic 
loss not being actionable in nuisance, see C Rodgers, ‘Liability for the Release of GMOs into the Environment: 
Exploring the Boundaries of Nuisance’ (2003) 62 CLJ 371, 382. 
126
 Cf above n 17. 
127
 Nor indeed within the civilian law tradition. A good recent illustration of a remedy for an injured view in 
French nuisance law is the case of Chateau de Flers, where the court found in favour of a neighbour who 
complained of the sight (and sound) of a wind farm. The turbines constituted what the court found to be a 
‘degradation of the environment, resulting from a rupture of a bucolic landscape and countryside’ (Owners of Le 
Château de Flers v La Compagnie du Vent (Tribunal de Grande Instance, Montpellier, Le Figaro, 2 October 
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 This, then, introduces a different slant on the familiar disciplinary issue of the 
divergence between ‘law in books’ and ‘law in practice’. The point in this analysis is not that 
doctrine does not determine the outcome of cases (relative, say, to ‘practical’ factors 
influencing the settlement of claims).
128
 Rather it is that doctrine is apt to be inaccurately 
expounded in situations well characterised by Sugarman, in his analysis of the English 
textbook tradition. The superficial treatment of Bland as a timeless ‘given’ does not do justice 
to the complexity of common law doctrine. This is important, because it can be linked to a 
regrettable decline in the esteem of doctrinal scholarship, and a steady drift away from 
doctrine towards theoretical or empirical ‘alternatives’. A flourishing modern law school will 
prioritise doctrinal analysis that is realistically nuanced, and with the potential to be 
impactful.
129
 Thus a textbook tradition broadly understood need not be at odds with current 
higher education research funding formulas.
130
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2013). For an historical perspective on the protection of an injured view in Roman law see Alan Rodger, Owners 
and Neighbours in Roman Law (Clarendon Press 1972). 
128
 Cf R Lewis, ‘Tort Tactics: An Empirical Study of Personal Injury Litigation Strategies (2017) 37 Legal 
Studies 162.  
129
 Legal academics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century are thought to have had a significant 
influence on the development of the common law, with (for example) Pollock’s Law of Torts inspiring Lord 
Macmillan’s judgment in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (See Duxbury, n 49, 267-268). There are signs 
of a renewed (and more explicit) judicial engagement with academic tort law, notably in connection with 
nuisance Lord Carnwath’s reference in Coventry to two monographs (A Beever, The Law of Private Nuisance 
(Hart 2013); B Pontin, Nuisance Law and Environmental Protection (Lawtext Publishing 2013)), four research 
articles (M Lee, ‘Tort Law and Regulation: Planning and Nuisance’ [2011] JPEL 988; and M Lee  ‘Nuisance 
Law and Regulation in the Court of Appeal’ [2013] JPEL 277; C Rotherham, ‘Gain-based Relief in Tort after A-
G v Blake’ (2013) 126 LQR 102; and M Wilde, ‘Nuisance Law and Damages in Lieu of an Injunction’, in S 
Pitel et al (eds), Tort Law: Challenging the Orthodoxy (Hart 2013), a tort textbook (T Weir, An Introduction to 
Tort Law, 2
nd
 ed (Oxford University Press 2006), as well as the ‘practitioner text’, Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 
20
th
 ed (Sweet and Maxwell 2010). 
130 See further Cownie, above n 16. 
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A Room with a View in English Nuisance Law: Exploring Modernisation 
Hidden within the ‘Textbook Tradition’ 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This article critically examines the consensus among tort scholars that an injured view is not 
in any circumstances actionable under English nuisance law or, as Richard Buckley puts it, 
that ‘it has long been clear that the law of nuisance does not confer protection upon enjoyment 
by an occupier of an attractive view or prospect.’
1
 The ‘authority’ on which the consensus 
rests is Bland v Moseley,
2
 an unreported Tudor case in which Sir Christopher Wray CJ stated 
that no action in nuisance lies for ‘stopping’ a ‘pleasing prospect’. There are, I argue, reasons 
to doubt that this case strongly supports the consensus. One is that the claim centred on loss 
of light, thus Wray’s categorical denial of liability in nuisance for causing injury to a 
neighbour’s view is obiter. Another is that Wray’s approach does not appear to have 
withstood nineteenth century modernisation in the law. In particular, it is difficult to reconcile 
with Lord Westbury’s opinion in Tipping v St Helen’s Smelting
3
 that nuisance remedies 
‘sensible personal discomfort’, covering anything that ‘injuriously affects the senses or the 
nerves’. 
The idea under consideration of a mismatch between formal law and academic 
exposition opens onto well-charted territory. David Sugarman made an important contribution 
to this with his critique of the ‘English textbook tradition’.
4
  Sugarman’s thesis is that 
Victorian and Edwardian-era legal scholars, exemplified by Professor Frederick Pollock, 
wrote textbooks that emphasised the permanence of common law principles, downplaying 
their changeability. They did so in order to counter a negative impression of the common law 
as chaotic and unpredictable, and thereby unworthy of a university education. The crucial part 
of Sugarman’s analysis for present purposes is that textbook understandings of the common 
law are ‘not reducible’ to the law itself.
5
 Against this, William Twining has suggested that 
formative legal scholars were attuned to the common law’s spontaneity, and that Pollock was 
in fact in the vanguard of a proto-realist understanding of ‘living law’.
6
 In defence of 
Sugarman, I argue that Pollock and other scholars writing about nuisance overlooked the 
                                                           
1 R A Buckley, Law of Nuisance (London: Butterworths, 1981) p 34. Similarly emphatic language can be found 
in more general tort texts, such as Keith Stanton’s statement regarding nuisance that ‘loss of view...is the most 
obvious form of loss that is excluded’ (K Stanton, The Modern Law of Tort (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 
1994), p 391). 
2
 National Archives, KB 27/1302 m 254 (Trinity 1587); Harvard Law School MS 16 fol 402, reproduced in J 
Baker and S F C Milsom (eds), Sources of English Legal History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) p 598. 
3
 (1865) 11 HL Cas 642. 
4
 D Sugarman, ‘Legal Theory, the Common Law Mind and the Making of the Textbook Tradition’, in W 
Twining (ed), Legal Theory and the Common Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) p 26. For a helpful overview 
of Sugarman’s thesis, see F Cownie, ‘Are We Witnessing the Death of the Textbook Tradition’ (2006) 3 
European Journal of Legal Education 79, and W Twining, Blackstone’s Tower (London: Sweet and Maxwell 
1994) pp 135-137. 
5
 Sugarman, ibid p 28. See too the distinction between lex lata (law as it is) and lex ferenda (law as it ought to 
be) in A Fernandez and M Dubber (eds), Law Books in Action: Essays on the Anglo-American Legal Treatise 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) p 1.  
6 Twining, Blackstone’s Tower (n 4 above).  
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modernity of contemporary case law.  The problematic consensus regarding Bland is an 
important legacy of this. 
The analysis begins with close attention to the decision in Bland, in its social and 
economic context (section 2). Beyond the relatively minor difficulty arising from the absence 
of an official report of this case,
7
 lie more substantial difficulties centring on the content of 
Wray’s judgment. The ratio of the case is that an interference with a neighbour’s light, such as 
to cause ‘terrible darkness’, is actionable, because it renders land uninhabitable. In medieval 
and early modern times, the words ‘view’, ‘prospect’ and ‘light’ were used interchangeably, 
and it is against this backdrop that Wray sought to introduce doctrinal precision, by 
distinguishing between injury to light (as something which is actionable because it is essential 
to the enjoyment of all land), and injury to a view of pleasing scenery (as something which is 
not). The dichotomy between light and view fitted broadly adequately with contemporary 
modes of enjoying property, for whilst possession of a pleasing view was ‘necessary’ to the 
landed elite - which invested heavily in beautiful property both for its intrinsic aesthetic value 
and as a symbol of grandeur - this investment was protected by the law of waste.  
Attention is then given to modernisation in the definition of actionable injury in the 
nineteenth century, through the reception into law of Lord Westbury’s opinion in Tipping 
(Section 3). Lord Westbury reasoned that things which are pleasing to some properties but not 
others do sound in nuisance, albeit on a locality-specific basis that differs from the universal 
actionability of physical injury. The remarks in Tipping about actionable injury are situated 
alongside a line of cases of the 1850s, concerning unpleasant odours from brickworks (Walter 
v Selfe,
8
  Hole v Barlow
9
 and Bamford v Turnley).
10
 They highlight significant differences of 
judicial opinion as to whether nuisance law protected against injured sensibility in the absence 
of ‘physicality’. Lord Westbury’s speech in Tipping provided resolution. In some of the 
literature, this aspect of Tipping is interpreted as a response to industrial pollution, and the 
perceived need to differentiate between the interests of proprietors in town and country.
11
 By 
contrast, I argue that Lord Westbury was principally responding to the emergence of suburbia, 
whose bourgeois residents invested heavily in the look (and smell etc) of land, without the 
security of the elite-oriented law of waste. That created a vacuum filled by nuisance law. 
Section 4 addresses doctrinal reasons that sometimes are advanced in support of the 
permanence of the ‘Rule in Bland’. Consideration is given to six reasons in particular, viz: (i) 
‘sensible personal discomfort’ does not engage the sense of sight; (ii) ‘discomfort’ is not an 
aesthetic criterion; (iii) an injured view is not an ‘emanation’ from land; (iv) a neighbour 
wishing to protect a pleasing view can adequately do so through agreeing a restrictive 
                                                           
7
 The significance of the unreported status of this case is that judges may decline to accept submissions on points 
of law arising from it: Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Practice Direction: Citation of Authorities 
(2012) para 10.  (https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Practice+Directions/lcj-
pract-dir-citation-authorities-2012.pdf). This is unlikely to be a problem with an iconic case like Bland.  
8
 (1851) 4 De G & Sm 315. 
9
 (1858) 140 ER 1113. 
10
 (1860) 122 E.R. 25. 
11  Notably J Brenner, ‘Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution’ (1974) 3 Journal of Legal Studies 403 
(arguing that Lord Westbury sought to facilitate the industrialisation of towns and cities).  For qualified support, 
see J McLaren, ‘Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution: Some Lessons from Social History’ (1983) 3 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 155 and B Pontin, ‘Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution: A 
Reinterpretation of Doctrine and Institutional Competence’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 1010. For a broadly 
supportive judicial statement, see Lord Hoffmann in Hunter v Canary Wharf [1995] AC 665, 705. 
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covenant; (v) the management of pleasing views is the province of planning regulation; and 
(vi) excluding this injury is necessary to control the floodgates of nuisance litigation. This 
reasoning is untested judicially, for in no English common law nuisance case is the 
actionability of injury to a pleasing view part of the ratio.
12
 Elsewhere in the common law 
world, interferences with pleasing views have occasionally found protection in the case law, 
broadly within the parameters of Tipping. The clearest example is the South African case of 
Waterhouse Properties v Hyperception Properties,
13
 in which obstruction of a ‘beautiful’ 
view was held actionable in nuisance by virtue of a property and locality that was ‘pretty’ and 
‘exclusive’.  
It is concluded (in section 5) that whilst the topic of injury to a view is easily 
dismissed as rather niche, and indeed of modest practical importance - ‘a broken window is 
more important than a broken view’
14
 - in reality, injury of this kind can be a very serious 
matter, not only in private law but also in public law terms.
15
 Sugarman’s critique of the 
textbook tradition in relation to the topic at hand is best understood not as an outright 
rejection of doctrinal scholarship (in favour of, say, a more theoretical or empirical 
‘alternative’),
16
 as much as a call for greater emphasis on the inherent corrigibility of doctrinal 
exposition, mirroring case law itself. Whether a claim in nuisance lies for an injured view is 
ultimately a matter for the courts, but it is hoped that the material explored below will be 
useful when the time comes for the courts to rule on the matter.  
 
2. The Rule in Bland v Moseley  
 
This section addresses medieval and early modern nuisance law relating to injured views. In 
its very earliest iteration, eight or more centuries ago, nuisance law principally remedied 
interferences with agrarian usages of land (e.g. raising or lowering of hedges, dykes, 
millponds, or obstruction of roads).
17
 Complaints about what can be loosely called ‘residential 
                                                           
12 For occasional chancery court cases on this point, see below n 133 and 137.  
13
[2004] ZAFSHC 97. 
14
 J Murphy, The Law of Nuisance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p 43.  
15 For a robust statement of the public interest in ‘beautiful’ scenery, backed by public law provision, see 
Parliamentary debate on the Florence Convention (Council of Europe, European Landscape Convention (2000)), 
and in particular Lord Judd:  
 
‘What is a society worth living in? It is a society that values landscape, beauty and aesthetic 
considerations. If we undermine those, what on earth are we doing?’ (House of Lords Debates, 13 June 
2008, col 763) 
 
See further J Holder, ‘Law and Landscape: The Legal Construction and Protection of Hedgerows’ (1999) 62 
Modern Law Review 100. By contrast, the concern in this article is with private law. 
16
 For an overview of this debate, see Cownie (on the role of UK research funding regimes on lowering the 
esteem of textbooks) and, more generally, the collection  of essays in R Gestel et al, Rethinking Legal 
Scholarship: A Transatlantic Dialogue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), especially Part II). 
17
 S F C Milsom, The Historical Foundations of the Common Law (London: Butterworths, 1969) p 118; D 
Coquillette, ‘Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at some Historic Property Cases about the 
Environment’ (1979) 64 Cornell L R 761, 770; J Loengard, ‘The Assize of Nuisance: Origins of an Action at 
Common Law (1978) 37 Cambridge Law Journal 144. 
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amenity’ are not discernible until the 1300s, in connection with the assize of nuisance.
18
 
Intriguingly, a substantial number of complaints in this setting centred on loss of view. For 
example, in a case of 1329, John and Isabel de Castleacre successfully protected from 
obstruction a view of an adjoining courtyard.
19
 Two years later, Isabel Goldchep obtained a 
remedy against John Ruddok, who ‘piled up his firewood against her window so high above 
the upper stone frame that it is completely obscured, and the light, view, air and clarity 
(claritatem) impeded’.
20
 Complaints about loss of view are as common as those directed at 
loss of light and polluted air, and far outnumbered complaints about noise. 
Yet it is unclear that parties in these cases were using the term ‘view’ in a 
recognisably modern sense, of aesthetically pleasing scenery.
21
 Janet Loengard suggests that 
injury to view (visum) and light (lumen) typically were pleaded interchangeably in this 
setting.
22
 That is crucial to bear in mind in interpreting Bland, on which today’s consensus 
regarding the exclusion of loss of view from the protection of the enjoyment of land offered 
by nuisance largely rests. The crux of the complaint in Bland was that the defendant’s newly 
built dwelling plunged the claimant’s into ‘terrible darkness’; the house became like a 
‘dungeon’.
23
 Though loss of view is alluded to in Wray’s speech, there no mention of the 
character of the view that the defendant’s property obscured, including whether it was 
pleasing and, if so, how. The ‘how?’ question is particularly pertinent, because it directs 
attention to the limited accessibility of scenery from Tudor dwellings, owing to window 
glazing being too opaque to reveal pleasing scenery; glazed windows let in light but did not 
afford a clear view of the world outside.
24
  
It is therefore extremely doubtful that the exclusion from nuisance law of liability for 
an injured view has anything to do with ratio of Bland. Even so, it seems inescapable that the 
notion of injury to light and to prospect having profoundly different legal significance 
accorded well with judicial opinion at the time. The prevailing opinion was that nuisance law 
protected only those aspects of property that are essential to enjoyment in all cases, such as 
some light. In contrast: 
 
                                                           
18
 See especially the records of the London assizes. London Assize of Nuisance, 1301-1441: A Calendar 
(London: London Records Society, 1973). 
19
 Ibid, Case No 305. 
20 Ibid, Case No 312. 
21
 On linguistic issues in the context of early modern case law, see generally M Lobban, ‘Introduction: the Tools 
and Tasks of the Legal Historian’, in A Lewis and M Lobban, Law and History (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004) pp 3-4.  
22
 J Loengard, ‘Common Law and Custom: Windows, Light and Privacy in Late Medieval England’, in S Jencks, 
J Rose, C Whittick (eds) Laws, Lawyers, Text (Leiden: Brill, 2012) p 279, p 287. 
23
 Bland, n 2. 
24
 On early modern glazing and its limited role in furnishing residential comforts, see: C Woolgar, The Senses in 
Late Medieval England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) p 63; Caroline Barron, London in the Middle 
Ages (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) p 251; and J E Crowley, The Invention of Comfort: Sensibilities 
and Design in Early Modern Britain (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001) pp 61-68. In poorer 
Tudor dwellings, windows were not glazed but covered by linen cloth (Woolgar p 73). Clear glazing was 
invented in the late seventeenth century: H Louw and R Crayford, ‘A Constructional History of the Sash 
Window, c 1670-1725’ (1998) 41 Architectural History 82. On the transformation of landscape architecture 
accompanying this technological change, see R Williams, The Country and the City (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1973) Ch 12 (entitled ‘Pleasing Prospects’). 
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for prospect, which is a matter only of delight, and not of necessity, no action lies for 
stopping thereof, and yet it is a great commendation of a house if it has a long and 
large prospect.
25
 
 
Coke cited this approvingly in Aldred’s Case.
26
 Likewise, William Blackstone wrote of a 
‘fine prospect’ being a ‘mere pleasure’ as opposed to ‘an indispensable requisite to every 
dwelling’.
27
  
Wray and Coke were operating within a philosophical-legal milieu dominated by 
natural law theory, which was at the height of its influence in Tudor/Stuart times, but on the 
wane when Blackstone was writing.
28
 Natural law in this setting framed the question of the 
scope of actionable injury in terms of rational deduction from a fixed premise in the 
judicially-defined ‘natural necessities’ of land. As stated by Coke, these are wholesome air 
(salubritas aeris), minimum light (neccesitas luminis), and a catch-all sense of basic 
habitability (habitato hominis). A pleasing view is axiomatically not essential to land’s 
habitability, being a matter of delight (delectatio inhabitantis). Looking briefly ahead to later 
in the analysis, this approach came under strain in an increasingly bourgeois society, whose 
individualism found expression in suburbs built upon the pillars of delight and respectability.  
Remaining with the early modern period, and sticking with the necessity/delight 
dichotomy, a conundrum thrown up by Bland concerns the premium placed on pleasing views 
by the contemporary landed establishment.
29
 Royalty and aristocracy invested substantially in 
properties having spectacular outlooks over delightful surroundings. Writing today, the 
architectural historian Oliver Creighton gives a number of examples.
30
 One is Kenilworth 
Castle, whose occupants enjoyed ‘sitting windows’ designed to look onto thoughtfully 
landscaped grounds (notably a large ornamental mere).
31
 The royal palace at Clarendon had 
female bedchambers, each with a window that opened onto an intimate view of an attractive 
private garden.
32
 Windsor Castle contained numerous rooms with expansive views over, 
variously, pleasure gardens, the deer park, hamlets and villages.
33
 Pleasing views in these 
settings served an important dual function. As well as being delightful to the eye, and thus of 
intrinsic aesthetic value, a room with a view positioned the proprietor at the apex of society. 
34
 
                                                           
25
 See above n 2, as reproduced in Aldred’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep f57b; (1610) 77 ER 816 660. 
26
 Ibid. See further R Monson, E Plowden, C Wray, J Manwood, A Briefe Declaration For What manner of 
speciall Nusance concerning private dwelling Houses (London: Holborne, 1639). 
27 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1752), Book III, Ch 
3.  
28
 On the ‘heyday’ of natural law thinking in early modern England, see D Ibbetson, ‘Natural Law and Common 
Law (2001) 5 Edin L R 4. See further Coquillette, above n 17, 769-773. 
29
 On the importance of the landed elite to the development of the common law see J Getzler, 'Theories of 
Property and Economic Development' (1996) 26 The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 639. See in the context 
of nuisance law Pontin, above n 11, 1011. 
30
 O H Creighton, ‘Seeing is Believing: Looking Out on Medieval Castle Landscapes’ (2011) 14 Concillium 
Medii Aevi 79.  
31
 Creighton, ibid, 85. 
32 Ibid 80. 
33
 Ibid, 85. 
34
 ‘In the middle ages an elevated view over the landscape was something special and unusual, to be experienced 
by the privileged minority’ (ibid 80-81).  According to Raymond Williams, the landed aristocracy lavished 
fortunes on landscape improvement, as an exemplar of ‘elevated sensibility’ which justified this rank’s elite 
place within society (n 24, p 121). 
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In practice, however, the elite was not prejudiced by Wray’s obiter dictum. Elite 
estates were of such extensive territorial reach that proprietors had almost complete mastery 
of the scenery viewable from the principal dwellings, and did not tend to fear the ‘spoiling’ 
acts or omissions of neighbours.
35
  Rather, the main threat to a beautiful outlook came from 
insiders – i.e. tenants of the estate, who were minded to remove, say, an attractive tree-lined 
vista. Protection of pleasing prospects in this setting was secured through the law of waste.
36
 
In Packington’s Case,
37
 the Lord Chancellor (Lord Hardwicke) ruled that a tenant for life who 
sought to destroy a sylvan landscape could be restrained by the reversioner. Similarly, in 
Aston’s Case,
38
 the same judge likened a tenant’s attempt to destroy a picturesque tree lined 
view from the family mansion to the destruction of the mansion itself (granting an injunction 
prohibiting the waste). Fraley draws upon Victorian-era waste treatise author Wyndham 
Bewes in commenting that ‘the law enforced waste strictly, holding landowners responsible 
for virtually all changes to the landscape’.
39
 This is not to suggest that waste protected views 
per se, for there is no authority to indicate that it did. However, the protection of landscapes 
offered the next best thing.
40
 
  
3. Nineteenth Century Modernisation in Actionable Nuisance: Understanding the 
Suburban Origins of ‘Sensible Personal Discomfort’ 
 
Some of the extensive tort scholarship dealing with nuisance law during the industrial 
revolution treats the law as undergoing significant changes in response to the emergence of 
the industrial bourgeoisie – a theme which I examine in this section in connection with the 
modern fate of Bland.
41
 One of the earliest analyses of this kind is Joel Brenner’s.
42
 His 
argument is that English courts applied nuisance law generously to wealth generating 
industrial polluters, sending out a clear signal that pollution in seats of industry was an 
acceptable price to pay for the material benefits of industrialisation. Brenner attributes 
particular significance to Lord Westbury’s judgment in Tipping:  
 
                                                           
35 The position changed with the monster nuisances of the industrial revolution, which prompted the elite’s 
reliance on nuisance law (Pontin, above n 11, 1017-18). 
36
 See generally J Fraley, ‘A New History of Waste Law: How a Misunderstood Doctrine Shaped Ideas about the 
Transformation of Law’ (2017) 100 Marquette Law Review 861. For cases dealing with landscapes, and 
indirectly views, see Packington v Layton (1744) 3 Atk 215; and Aston v Aston (1749) 1 Ves Sen 264. 
37 Ibid. 
38
 Ibid 266. 
39
 Fraley, above n 36 (at 869) [my emphasis]. The author cites W Bewes, The Law of Waste: A Treatise on the 
Rights and Liabilities which arise from the Relationship of Limited Owners and the Owners of the Inheritance 
with Reference to the Tenements (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1894) p 9. 
40 On the subtle distinction between ‘view’ and ‘landscape’, see M Lee, ‘Knowledge and Landscape in Wind 
Energy Planning’ (2017) 37 Legal Studies 3, 8-10. Applied to waste law, this area of common law can be 
understood as focusing on the physical sub-dimension of landscapes rather than the ‘visual response’. This is 
returned to below (n 139 and associated text).  
41
 Above n 2. 
42 Above n 11.  
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If a man lives in a town, it is necessary that he should subject himself to the 
consequences of those operations of trade which may be carried on in his immediate 
locality.
43
  
 
In this dictum, Lord Westbury is justifying why an action for ‘sensible personal discomfort’ 
must be determined with reference to the character of the neighbourhood, with townsfolk 
expected to tolerate ‘consequences’ (discomforts) that others are not. Lord Hoffmann (in 
Hunter) commented that Lord Westbury here ‘drew the line beyond which rural and landed 
England did not have to accept external costs imposed upon it by industrial pollution’.
44
 
However, Brenner’s emphasis is less on the interests of the landed establishment and more on 
those of the new middle classes, and rightly, I argue, at least in connection with the topic at 
hand.
45
 
 As with any class-deterministic account of the development of the common law, 
regard must be had to Richard Epstein’s cautionary argument that people with the wealth to 
litigate tort law do not necessarily have a zero sum interest in either a ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ 
provision.
46
  As a rule of thumb, a wealthy person is as likely to be a victim as a perpetrator of 
a tort. This applies specifically to the present subject matter (I argue), insofar as the Victorian 
era bourgeoisie sought from the common law both a narrow and a broad definition of 
actionable nuisance. They sought a narrow definition from the perspective of the seats of 
industry in which personal wealth was generated, on the individualist rationale that the urban 
proletariat’s members ‘subjected themselves’ to some pollution (roughly Brenner’s 
argument), but they sought a broad definition to protect the amenities of affluent suburban 
neighbourhoods on the outskirts of urban conurbations (something that is overlooked in 
Brenner’s analysis, but is supportive of his core thesis). Interestingly, social historians 
characterise suburbs as a new type of neighbourhood, where paramount importance was 
attributed to ‘artistic beauty’, ‘display’, ‘tranquillity’ and ‘gentility’.
47
 They were, it is said, 
‘an instrument of moral, aesthetic and sanitary improvement [and] – a least at the beginning – 
of class segregation’.
48
   
 Brenner’s analysis of common law change does not deal with this aspect of the law’s 
socio-economic context, nor crucially does it acknowledge the possibility that social change 
led to doctrinal change. Brenner locates change at a less formal – or more covert - level of the 
law's application (de facto rather than de jure).
49
 His point is that change was hidden to 
conceal the underlying increase in power of the middle classes, but this makes his work an 
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 Tipping 650. Brenner comments that this was ‘discriminatory’ against the urban proletariat (Brenner, n 11, 
415).  
44
 Hunter 705. 
45
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unwitting contributor to Sugarman’s ‘textbook tradition’. Sugarman’s ‘tradition’ is 
characterised by Victorian era English legal academics who sought to downplay the 
changeability of the common law in order to emphasise its principled permanence.
50
 That 
strategy, Sugarman claims, was motivated by a nascent disciplinary goal of establishing law 
as a subject worthy of university study, against the backdrop of an intellectual climate in 
which the common law was apt to be treated as too changeable, even chaotic, to merit 
scholarly attention. Whilst Brenner’s concern is with the politics of industrialisation rather 
than the politics of university legal education, the emphasis on what he calls nuisance law’s 
‘semantic continuity’ as between pre-industrial and industrial periods closely corresponds 
with, and reinforces, Sugarman’s ‘tradition’. 
 Sugarman’s thesis is not wholly shared by William Twining,
51
  who singles out the 
work of Dicey, together with professor of common law Frederick Pollock,
52
 to highlight a 
more dynamic scholarly conception of common law doctrine that engaged openly with 
common law modernisation. Dicey wrote of ‘judicial legislation’ in terms that merit rather 
extensive quotation, with Brenner’s analysis in mind: 
 
Nor let anyone imagine that judicial legislation is a kind of law making which belongs wholly 
to the past…New combinations of circumstances—that is, new cases—constantly call for the 
application, which means in truth the extension of old principles; or, it may be, even for the 
thinking out of some new principle, in harmony with the general spirit of the law, fitted to 
meet the novel requirements of the time. Hence whole branches not of ancient but of very 
modern law have been built up, developed, or created by the action of the Courts.53 
 
However, Dicey did not elaborate on this in relation to tort generally, or nuisance law in 
particular. 
Pollock, in the preface to Law of Torts, explicitly adopted the ‘living law’ paradigm 
similar to that popularised across the Atlantic by Holmes (and Dicey).
54
 He applauded the 
work of a selection of modernising English judges, highlighting the contributions of Lords 
Blackburn and Bramwell and Mr Justice Willes.
55
 Yet there is a noticeable gap between 
Pollock’s rhetoric of living law in the context of tort as a whole and his dry and banal 
exposition of the nuts and bolts of particular areas, including nuisance law.
56
 For example, 
Pollock’s definition of actionable nuisance relies heavily on Knight Bruce VC’s judgment in 
Walter v Selfe.
57
 As is discussed further below, Knight Bruce confined actionable nuisance to 
interferences with the enjoyment of property of a physical nature – impairing the ‘physical 
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comfort of human existence’
58
 That implied continuity with the restrictive position of the 
early modern law described in the previous section. Yet Pollock addressed cases neither 
before nor after Walter, offering nothing more than a snapshot of a particular moment, 
represented by a specific judgment. This overlooked the possibility explored below that the 
law was changing to recognise actionable injury of a non-physical character, dealing with 
injury to modern sensibility. 
Other general tort scholars writing at this time interpreted the law a little less 
restrictively. For example, John Salmond asserted that for an interference with the enjoyment 
of land to be actionable in nuisance the key criterion was that the interference is substantial;
59
 
he did not insist that it have a physical component. He further acknowledged that the standard 
of comfort differed according to the character of the locality. Whilst Salmond acquired a 
reputation for nuance in tort scholarship,
60
 there is no hint of the ‘living law’ character of 
nuisance, and this is fodder for Sugarman’s thesis. Like Pollock, Salmond portrays the law on 
the topic of the definition of nuisance as somewhat permanent, rather than being altered to 
suit urbanisation and suburbanisation discussed later in this section.  
Moving on to an example of a nuisance treatise, Sugarman’s ‘tradition’ also finds 
expression in the leading text written by Garrett and Garrett.
61
 Whilst recognising that 
nuisance remedies both physical injury and non-physical injury (qua sensible discomfort), the 
authors offered no contextualisation of this in terms of the development of the law in response 
to societal change. Thus it is perhaps inevitable that when the authors addressed the topic of 
injury to a pleasing view, they cited the dicta of Wray in Bland and Coke in Aldred as an 
enduringly accurate encapsulation of the current law.
62
 The analysis below explores an 
alternative understanding of the law. It identifies what is argued to be modernisation in the 
law on this point that is hidden within the tradition of which these and other authors are part. 
The focus is on a trilogy of brickworks nuisance cases beginning with Walter, in which the 
judiciary could not agree on whether to keep with the established definition of nuisance or 
embrace a revised one. Out of this divergence of opinion emerged Lord Westbury’s modern 
formulation of nuisance in Tipping, which represented a break from the law of Wray and 
Coke. 
 
Injured Sensibility in London’s Victorian Suburbs – the Brickworks Trilogy 
 
A distinctively modern feature of the cases concerning brickworks under scrutiny, leading up 
to Tipping, is that they were each brought by a claimant from London’s new suburbs, in 
respect of odours that were unpleasant without being harmful to health or otherwise 
‘physically’ damaging.
63
 The suburban character of the claim in Walter is gleaned from the 
reference in the report to the claimant owning a property in Surbiton, on which had been 
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‘spen[t] considerable sums of money…on the garden, lawn and pleasure ground [in] 
rendering the same habitable and fit for residence by a respectable tenant’.
64
 The claimant in 
Hole occupied a property in an unspecified West London suburb.
65
 The claimant in Bamford v 
Turnley owned a ‘splendid’ villa within the ‘beautiful’ Beulah Spa estate, recently constructed 
on enclosed common land in Norwood, south of the city.
66
  
The central legal issue in Walter v Selfe was whether common law nuisance remedied 
injury to a proprietor’s sensibility. The defendant said not, asserting that it is ‘not mere 
offensiveness of a smell that will entitle a neighbour to an injunction’.
67
 Rather, the smell 
must be ‘injurious to health’, or at least ‘unwholesome’.
68
 Though Knight Bruce VC found 
for the claimant, his reasoning is hard to follow, because it frames the actionability of an 
odour in unconvincing terms of physicality:  
 
ought this inconvenience to be considered in fact as more than fanciful, more than one 
of mere delicacy or fastidiousness, as an inconvenience materially interfering with the 
ordinary comfort physically of human existence, not merely according to elegant or 
dainty modes and habits of living, but according to plain and sober and simple notions 
among the English people?
69
 
 
As mentioned above, in Law of Torts, Pollock endorsed this passage as an accurate 
encapsulation of the definition of actionable nuisance.
70
 He added that this precluded a claim 
based on ‘mere loss of amenity’.
71
 
Pollock’s analysis is difficult to sustain.  This is principally because it ignores the 
difficulty of reconciling Knight Bruce’s statement in this case with Lord Westbury’s speech 
in Tipping, which provided for actionable non-physical injury, now generally known as 
‘amenity nuisance’.
72
 It cannot be ruled out that Pollock was exercising a censorial role here, 
to the effect that he was championing Knight Bruce’s approach as correct, and discouraging 
adherence to Lord Westbury’s incautiously expansive remarks about the possibility of remedy 
for injury to sensibility independent of physicality. Pollock’s censorial aims are discussed in 
Neil Duxbury’s in-depth treatment of his work.
73
 Alternatively, the mismatch between 
exposition and positive law in this instance may be a further illustration of the ‘over-
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simplication’ noted by Stephen Waddams in relation to Pollock’s contract writing.
74
  Either 
way, the pertinent point is that Pollock did not accurately expound on the law of the day 
regarding actionable injury.
75
 
The beginning of the end of the requirement of physicality, which I suggest is central 
to an understanding of the shift away from the dictum of Wray in Bland, is Hole. This case is 
best known today for Byles’ ruling that nuisance occasioned by a suitably located trade, 
conducted in a reasonable manner, is not actionable. Present day commentary is largely 
critical of this, and in particular, what is said to be the unduly industry-sympathetic policy 
behind the locality test, namely, to avoid ‘great injury of the manufacturing and social 
interests of the community’.
76
  However, this policy is surely sound when situated in the 
context of a claim for injury to sensibility, as indeed it must be because of the facts of the 
case.
77
 The defendant had argued, as per Walter, that an unpleasant smell was not actionable 
absent materiality or physicality. Byles dispensed with this requirement, ruling that ‘it is 
enough if it [the nuisance] renders the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable’.
78
  He 
reigned in the potentially broad scope of this ruling through the pragmatic remark that the 
actionability of discomfort is relative to the character of the neighbourhood. 
These differences in the formulation of actionable injury in Walter and Hole are 
reflected in the divided Court of Exchequer in Bamford v Turnley, where opinion differed as 
to which of the approaches of Knight Bruce and Byles was correct. The majority of the Court 
(Pollock CB dissenting) favoured Knight Bruce, thus the court departed from Byles’ ruling in 
Hole. Williams J (on behalf of Erle and Keating JJ, and Wilde B)
79
 denied that the character 
of the neighbourhood ever had anything to do with actionability in nuisance. The correct 
position was simple and well established: i.e. an ‘annoyance’ is either ‘sufficiently great’ to 
be actionable universally (i.e. regardless of locality), or it is not actionable at all.
80
 The sense 
of continuity with the early modern case law noted in the previous section is apparent in the 
statement that: 
 
a man may, without being liable to an action, exercise a lawful 
trade…notwithstanding it be carried on so near the house of another as to be an 
annoyance to him, in rendering his residence there less delectable or agreeable.
81
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This is the approach of Wray, Coke and Blackstone. 
By contrast, the Court of Exchequer’s chief judge, Pollock,
82
 broadly favoured the 
approach taken by Byles in Hole. He propounded a flexible definition of actionable nuisance 
that moved beyond the necessity-pleasure dichotomy of an earlier, simpler society:   
 
The question so entirely depends on the surrounding circumstances,—the place where, 
the time when, the alleged nuisance, what, the mode of committing it, how, and the 
duration of it, whether temporary or permanent, occasional or continual,—as to make 
it impossible to lay down any rule of law applicable to every case, and which will also 
be useful in assisting a jury to come to a satisfactory conclusion:—it must at all times 
be a question of fact with reference to all the circumstances of the case.83  
 
The explicit modernity of this is captured by Pollock’s reference to ‘actions which nobody in 
Westminster Hall dreamed of [being brought within nuisance law] as we become more 
familiar with the exigencies of society’.
84
  
   
Tipping and the Emergence of ‘Sensible Personal Discomfort’  
 
Despite Professor Pollock’s ambivalence towards the case, Tipping has come to be 
understood as the leading authority on nuisance, laying the foundations of the law today. As 
explained by Brian Simpson,
85
 Tipping was a painstakingly and expensively constructed test 
case brought by wealthy parties aimed at resolving the confusion arising from the Hole and 
Bamford rulings. Of the various speeches of their Lordships, attention has centred on that of 
Lord Westbury, the Lord Chancellor within Viscount Palmerston’s cabinet. Tipping was the 
final judgment of his career – his ‘swansong’
86
 – but Simpson’s analysis is critical. The 
problem (so Simpson suggested) is that Lord Westbury’s distinction between physical and 
non-physical injury is ‘sloppy’, in two ways.
87
 First, it fails to define material or physical 
injury (actionable absolutely). Second, it resurrects the ‘ghost’ of Hole, in making so-called 
‘sensible personal discomfort’ actionable subject to the character of the neighbourhood.
88
  
 This misses the point that the central issue in Hole (and indeed all the brickworks 
cases) was the actionability of injured sensibility, independent of physicality. It also neglects 
the care that Lord Westbury took to define actionable ‘sensible personal discomfort’. It is 
defined as ‘anything that discomposes or injuriously affects the senses or the nerves’.
89
 At 
face value, the reference to ‘anything’ encompasses the senses of smell, hearing, taste and 
sight (and, with less obvious application) touch. On this reading, Lord Westbury’s judgment 
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in Tipping is an ingenious  stroke of modernity, which recognises that the time has arrived for 
liberalisation in the scope of actionable injury to encompass injured sensibility, and to do so 
on a locality-specific, rather than universal, basis. This is a break from the old architecture in 
regard to both the nuisances covered (a range of non-physical ones) and the structure of 
coverage (relative rather than universal). 
Shortly after Tipping, the judgment in Crump v Lambert
90
 dispelled any sense that the 
novel heading of sensible personal discomfort might evolve into a ‘second class’ form of 
actionable nuisance. The case concerned noise from a blast furnace on the outskirts of a 
midlands industrial centre, which the defendant submitted ought in equity be treated 
differently from a case involving physical injury; an injunction should not be granted for mere 
discomfort. The court rejected this, ruling that sensible personal discomfort, where out of 
character with the neighbourhood, was no less substantial by virtue of its lack of physicality, 
and merited the award of an injunction. This was the first in a long line of injunctions 
awarded under Lord Westbury’s sensible personal discomfort heading.  
What, though, of any cases in which explicit recognition is given to Tipping as a case 
that modernised the law, by departing from the necessity-delight dichotomy of old? In an 
easement-focused case, Angus v Dalton,
91
 Lord Blackburn impugned the rule in Bland as out-
dated:  
 
The distinction between a right to light and a right to prospect, on the grounds that one 
is a matter of necessity whereas the other of delight, is to my mind more quaint than 
satisfactory.
92
  
 
Blackburn is singled out by Pollock as a preeminent moderniser.
93
 What exactly is out-dated 
here is not specified, and to imply that it is a reference to Tipping and its wider legal and 
social context would be pure guesswork. But that does not lessen the significance of this 
negative treatment of Bland by a distinguished Law Lord in which (for Pollock) the ‘fire’ of 
modernity burned. Surprisingly, Angus is portrayed as supportive of the permanence of 
Bland.
94
  
  
4. Reasons for the Permanence of the ‘Rule in Bland’? 
 
This section identifies and evaluates the reasons given for the enduring validity of Wray’s 
analysis, as per the consensus. As noted at the outset, the veracity of the consensus is largely 
considered self evident – it is clear or obvious, and reasons beyond this do not much come 
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into the picture. Nevertheless, drawing on fragments of scholarly and judicial material –
including within the wider common law world – it is possible to identify six purported 
rationales:  
 
(i) ‘Sensible personal discomfort’ does not engage the sense of sight; 
(ii)  Discomfort is not an aesthetic criterion; 
(iii)  An injured view is not an emanation from land; 
(iv)  A proprietor wishing to protect a pleasing view can adequately do so through 
agreeing a restrictive covenant with their neighbour; 
(v)  The protection of pleasing views over and above covenants is better secured 
through planning regulation;  
(vi)  Excluding injured views is necessary to control the floodgates of litigation. 
 
These are examined in turn.  
 
‘Sensible Personal Discomfort’ Does Not Engage the Sense of Sight 
 
This was addressed by the Court of Appeal in Thompson Schwab.
95
 The discomforting sight 
at the centre of this case was a Mayfair brothel, which the claimant considered offensive. One 
of the defence arguments was to challenge the suggestion that ‘sensible personal discomfort’ 
encompassed indecent sights. Finding for the claimant, Lord Evershed said of the defendant’s 
activities: 
 
 
It does not, to my mind, follow at all that their [the defendant] activities should be 
regarded as free from the risk or possibility that they cause a nuisance in the proper 
sense of that term to a neighbour merely because they do not impinge upon the senses 
– for example the nose or the ear – as would the emanation of a smell or a noise.
96
 
 
This was strongly supported, with helpful elaboration, by the author of the case note in the 
Law Quarterly Review: ‘As it is clear that anything which is obnoxious to the senses of 
hearing and smelling may constitute a nuisance, it would be astonishing if the sense of seeing 
should be regarded as excluded’.
97
  
  Thompson Schwab is an important case that is returned to below in connection with a 
further rationale for the consensus (in regard to the ‘requirement’ of an emanation from land). 
Staying with the point at hand, it is pertinent to acknowledge two other English claims in 
which injuries to the sense of sight have been held actionable in principle, namely, Cook v 
South West Water Services,
98
 and Hughes v South West Water.
99
 Each concerns pollution of 
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rivers by sewage, which spoilt the visual appearance of the ‘land’ in aesthetic terms (rather 
than in terms of public morality/indecency). In Cook, the judge found (on the basis of 
photographic evidence) that foam and algae caused by the nutrient rich sewage ‘defac[ed] the 
beauty of the river in its progress through delightful countryside.’
100
 The claim succeeded on 
this basis. Similarly, in Hughes, sewage pollution amounted to nuisance by virtue of ‘the 
visual effect of the algal blooms, the unpleasantness of bringing in tackle with green slime on 
it’.
101
 These county court cases are persuasive in principle, if not of course binding. 
 
Discomfort is not an ‘aesthetic criterion’ 
 
Writing in the 1940s, Cecil Fifoot asserted that ‘a householder cannot in nuisance complain if 
his outlook is spoilt [because]…comfort, and not aesthetics, offer[s] the criterion’.
102
  The 
pollution cases above are a challenge to that analysis, but some support for this can be found 
in the United States case law. Though not binding in England and Wales, US case law offers 
an interesting comparative perspective. For example, in the Missouri case of Ness,
103
 the 
plaintiff complained of unsightly rubbish (rusted metal, broken concrete, old sinks and stoves) 
dumped in the neighbouring yard.  The Missouri Court of Appeals denied the claim: 
 
Aesthetic considerations are fraught with subjectivity…beauty is in the eye of the 
beholder. Judicial forage into such a nebulous area would be chaotic. Any imaginary 
good from doing so is far outweighed by the lurking danger of unduly circumscribing 
inherent rights of ownership of property and grossly intimidating their lawful exercise. 
This court has no inclination to knowingly infuse the law with such rampant 
uncertainty.
104
 
 
Perhaps the most recent illustration of this approach is the Vermont Supreme Court’s refusal 
this year, in the case of Myrick, to overturn late nineteenth century state authority to the effect 
that an unsightly use of land is not actionable in the absence of malice.
105
 One of the reasons 
given for the outcome of Myrick was that visual aesthetic nuisance is ‘unquantifiable’.  
This is not however the consensus position across the US federation, for there is 
significant variation on this point between the various US states. Some states go as far as to 
remedy an ugly land use when accompanied by more established actionable discomforts (e.g. 
noise or smell).  Thus in Sowers, the defendant’s plans for a wind turbine were injuncted on 
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the basis of ugliness and noise; pure ugliness would not have been sufficient.
106
 Sometimes 
state judges have gone further in recognising the soundness of a claim where the unpleasant 
sight of the defendant’s activities is the claim’s sole basis. An early and oft-noted example is 
Virginian case of Parkersburg Builders Material Company v Barrack (another case 
concerning nuisance unsightly scrap in a residential area).
107
  Judge Maxwell stated that:  
 
Happily, the day has arrived when persons may entertain appreciation of the aesthetic 
and be heard in equity [and common law] in vindication of their love of the 
beautiful…Basically, this is because a thing visually offensive may seriously affect 
the residents of a community in the reasonable enjoyment of their homes.
108
 
This approach was taken in the Colorado case of Allison v Smith – another scrap case.
109
  
Judge Metzger stated that the unsightly waste could amount to a nuisance, insofar as it 
amounted to an unreasonable and substantial interference with the enjoyment of land. It did 
not matter that the scrap was not smelly or noisy. Being a source of discomfort was enough. 
In this respect, the judge rightly described the scope of actionable discomfort as ‘inclusive’.
110
 
That approach appears to have academic support.
111
 
 However, it is in the South African case of Waterhouse Properties
112
 that Lord 
Westbury’s dictum in Tipping finds some of its clearest expression. The complaint concerned 
obstruction of a view of a ‘pretty river’ by the raising of the defendant’s roof. It was argued 
by the claimant that the injury was actionable because the view was integral to the enjoyment 
of their property, which was located in a ‘pretty’ and ‘exclusive’ neighbourhood. The court 
agreed (per Justice Rampai):  
 
If we accept and I believe we should, that we are here dealing with an extraordinary 
situation of two neighbouring properties with unique attributes, developed in a highly 
exclusive area on the pretty bank of a splendid river which is the soul of everything in 
the rich men’s playground – then we must appreciate, and acknowledge that to a 
reasonable and neutral property owner in that particular society a view of the river in 
                                                           
106
 Sowers v Forest Hills Subdivision 129 Nev Advance Opinion 9 (2013). The injunction was granted on the 
basis of a combination of noise nuisance, ‘flicker’, and aesthetic injury, but it was made clear that the latter alone 
would have been insufficient ((‘aesthetics alone cannot form the basis of a private nuisance action’).  
107
 118 W. Va. 608, 191 S.E. 368 (1937). See similarly State ex rel Carter v Harper (1923) 182 Wis. 148, 159, 
196 N.W. 451, 455 (‘As a race, our sensibilities are becoming more refined and that which formerly did not 
offend cannot now be endured … nauseous smells have always come under the ban of the law, but ugly sights 
and discordant surroundings may be just as distressing to keener sensibilities’.) 
108
 Ibid. 
109
 Allison v Smith 695 P.2d, 791, 794 (1984) 
110
 Ibid 
111
 Beginning with D Noel, ‘Unaesthetic Sights as Nuisances (1939) 25 Cornell Law Quarterly 1, and including 
more recently R Coletta,  ‘Case for Aesthetic Nuisance: Rethinking Traditional Judicial Attitudes (1987) 48 
Ohio St L J 141,G Smith and G Fernandez, ‘The Price of Beauty: An Economic Approach to Aesthetic 
Nuisance’ (1991) 15 Harvard Environmental Law Review 53; R Dodson, ‘Rethinking Private Nuisance Law: 
Recognizing Aesthetic Nuisances in the New Millennium’ (2002) 10 South Carolina Environmental Law 
Journal 1. 
112 Above n 13. 
Page 36 of 42Legal Studies
For Review Only
question is much more than a pure aesthetic matter.  It is an asset with unquestionable 
proprietary significance.
113
  
 
Whilst the judge rejected the actionability of ‘pure aesthetic loss’, he accepted that the loss of 
aesthetic value was discomforting, whereby it derived its proprietary significance. 
Returning to Fifoot’s point in the context of English and wider common law world 
case law, the difficulty is that it is precisely because comfort is the criterion that aesthetic-
based loss is in principle actionable. In plenty of cases comfort and aesthetics are closely 
intertwined. The cases noted in the previous sections illustrate this, perhaps above all 
Bamford v Turnley, in which there were multiple layers of aesthetic consideration at play – 
the pleasing look of the property, the unpleasant (but not unhealthy) smell in particular.
114
 Yet 
the parties in this dispute did not (as Fifoot in the quote above does) seek to distinguish 
between aesthetics and comfort.  
 
 
Emanation from land 
 
It is said that normally a nuisance will take the form of an ‘emanation’ from the land of the 
defendant, which ‘invades’ the land of the neighbour. Lord Goff in Hunter mentioned that: 
 
more is required than the mere presence of a neighbouring building to give rise to an 
actionable private nuisance. Indeed, for an action in private nuisance to lie in respect 
of interference with the plaintiff's enjoyment of his land, it will generally arise from 
something emanating from the defendant's land.
115
 
 
This is a general requirement, but there are exceptions. As Lord Lloyd pointed out in this 
case, a nuisance can take the form of state of affairs.
116
 That is the form in which seemingly 
most of the successful impaired view cases from around the common law world have been 
presented. For example, in Sowers, the injunction prohibited ‘a significant imposition’ on the 
plaintiffs (taking the form of a 75ft wind turbine).
117
  The turbine risked imposing a ‘sizeable 
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114
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obstacle overshadowing’ the plaintiffs’ land, which could have an ‘impact on views’. The 
terms ‘impact’, ‘imposition’ and ‘overshadowing’ are not the same as ‘emanation’. The 
nuisance here takes the form of a state of affairs.
118
  
On the other hand, it is unclear that it is indeed necessary to depart from the rhetoric of 
emanation to cater for the actionability of an offensive sight. In Thompson Schwab v 
Costaki
119
 Lord Evershed used the language of emanation in stating that the defendant and 
their clientele ‘force[d] themselves on the sense of sight’ of the neighbouring claimant and his 
family.
120
 It has been suggested by one commentator that ‘emanation’ is in this context being 
used metaphorically.
121
 But as light travels, a bad view can emanate literally, no less than a 
bad noise or smell. Yet pedantry aside, the state of affairs paradigm is advantageous, because 
it reinforces the non-physical nature of an injured view, and indeed of injured sensibilities 
more generally. 
 
Alternative Private Law Remedies 
 
Lord Lloyd in Hunter considered that a principal objection to nuisance law remedying an 
injured view is that a neighbour wishing to protect a pleasing view can adequately do so by 
means of a restrictive covenant:  
 
The house-owner who has a fine view of the South Downs may find that his neighbour 
has built so as to obscure his view. But there is no redress, unless, perchance, the 
neighbour's land was subject to a restrictive covenant in the house-owner's favour.
122
  
 
A case that highlights the potential of this land law/contractual approach is Dennis v 
Davies.
123
 On facts similar to Waterhouse Properties (obstruction of a view over a pretty 
river, in this case the Thames), the claimant established that they suffered an ‘annoyance’ 
contrary to a covenant prohibiting a ‘nuisance or an annoyance’.  
Such wording in covenants is fairly standard practice, and thus Dennis may come to 
the aid of a considerable number of proprietors who, constrained by the consensus, are 
advised that an injured view does not sound in nuisance. But that begs the central question: 
what is the basis for treating a loss of view as at most an annoyance? Covenants and 
nuisances engage discrete areas of law, which converge from time to time without ever 
limiting one another. Nuisance law has an entirely distinctive normative basis. As explained 
well by Lord Millett, with nuisance the ‘governing principle is good neighbourliness…A 
landowner must show the same consideration for his neighbour as he would expect his 
neighbour to show for him’.
124
 Covenants deal with obligations that arise under contract.  
 
The Impact of Regulation 
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Lord Hoffmann in Hunter stated that planning regulation was a more suitable forum within 
which to protect cherished views than a nuisance action: 
 
the planning system is, I think, a far more appropriate form of control, from the point 
of view of both the developer and the public, than enlarging the right to bring actions 
for nuisance at common law. It enables the issues to be debated before an expert 
forum at a planning inquiry and gives the developer the advantage of certainty as to 
what he is entitled to build.
125
 
 
Once again, the reference to ‘enlargement’ of actionable injury begs the central question at 
issue in this article (in which it is suggested that nuisance law might already protect against 
private injury to a pleasing view). But there are three further difficulties with Lord 
Hoffmann’s reasoning.  
First, a proprietor with the benefit of a pleasing view which they wish to protect from 
harmful development may not be permitted to have their objections taken into account by the 
planning authority. This is because loss of a private view is not normally a material 
consideration for purposes of statutory development control.
126
 Planning lawyers in this 
context tend to distinguish between a private interest in the pleasing view (not normally a 
material consideration) and the public interest in a pleasing ‘landscape’ (normally a material 
consideration). This is not the place to enter into a discussion of public law protection of 
landscapes. The point, rather, is that the planning system is not designed to resolve disputes 
between neighbours over private views, or indeed any other private law matter.
127
 
A related difficulty is that Hunter was decided before Coventry v Lawrence,
128
 in 
which the Supreme Court overturned earlier authority concerning the impact of planning on 
nuisance. It departed from the ruling in Gillingham Borough Docks
129
 that planning 
permission alters the character of the neighbourhood within which the actionability of 
sensible personal discomfort falls to be assessed.  The case law here (including Hunter) is part 
of a broader debate about the scope for public regulation of land use rendering overlapping 
areas of private law obsolescent.
130
 The main significance of Coventry is the ruling that 
planning regulation and nuisance law are autonomous administrative and private law 
provisions, which co-exist in parallel (rather than the former cutting down or otherwise 
limiting the latter, or vice versa). Lord Hoffmann’s notion that planning control is ‘more 
appropriate’ than nuisance law in regard to the remedying of injured views implies a 
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functional substitutability did not anticipate the significant extent to which the two now 
operate in parallel as a consequence of Coventry. 
Finally, the Supreme Court in Coventry ruled that public interest considerations of the 
kind that occupied Lord Hoffmann come into play not so much through the door of liability 
but through the exercise of discretion regarding the award of equitable remedies, notably an 
injunction.
131
 Whilst planning permission no longer alters the character of the neighbourhood 
for purposes of nuisance liability, it may weigh in favour of a decision to award damages in 
lieu of an injunction.
132
 Ex hypothesi, were a wind turbine operator, on facts broadly similar 
to Sowers, be found liable in nuisance on the basis of sensible personal discomfort visually 
(or in any other sense), it is open to them to argue that equitable damages are a more 
appropriate remedy (say because it is not in the public interest to halt renewable energy 
generation which promotes statutory carbon budgets on the basis of an individual’s 
discomfort). 
 
 
Floodgates 
 
Both Lords Lloyd and Hoffmann in Hunter refer approvingly to Lord Hardwicke’s 
consequentialist reasoning in Attorney General v Doughty,
133
 concerning the negative impact 
on urban development of a ‘right to a view’.  In this eighteenth century chancery appeal case 
the Lord Chancellor stated: 
 
I know no general rule of common law, which warrants that, or says, that building so 
as to stop another's prospect is a nuisance. Was that the case, there could be no great 
towns; and I must grant injunctions to all the new buildings in this town.
 134
 
 
This is cited by some of the judges in Hunter as a justification for an injured view never 
sounding in nuisance.
135
 However, the passage above is more particularistic. It is to the effect 
that the ‘stopping’ of a view over another’s land is not generally actionable in ‘great towns’. 
As Lord Hardwicke says in this case: ‘There may be such a right as this’,
136
 such that the 
development proceeded ‘at its peril’.
137
  
Lord Hardwicke’s remarks open onto a deeper concern about the difficulty of defining 
an injured view with sufficient precision to avoid damaging uncertainty. Wray’s bright line 
exclusion in Bland has certainty on its side. Yet nuisance law has a number of control devices 
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that limit this uncertainty and guard against the risk of an unmanageable flood of litigation. 
One is the objectivity of the standard of sensible personal discomfort in terms of the 
‘reasonable neighbour’. Application of this standard may benefit from ‘technical’ expertise as 
it does with smells and noise, such of the wide variety of aesthetic, social, economic, cultural 
and ecological expertise that informs planning inquiries dealing with objections to 
development based on harm to landscape.
138
 However, the difference is that nuisance is 
concerned with private relationships and private (in this case visual) perceptions of discomfort 
rather than public interest in regards to a landscape. And as Maria Lee points out, ‘human 
responses may be more openly discussed in respect of visual impacts than landscapes’.
139
 
This inspire confidence in the scope for resolving nuisance claims involving interference with 
a pleasing view. 
Other control devices which limit exposure to liability include the absence of a thin 
skull rule of the kind that is applicable to negligence (a defendant in nuisance proceedings 
will not be obliged to accommodate a claimant’s unconventional or otherwise idiosyncratic 
aesthetic sensibility). Another is the locality test, which means that different areas are subject 
to higher or lower standards of ‘visual amenity’. Further ‘limiting devices’ to note include the 
de minimis damage rule, the bar to a remedy for economic loss, and the requirement of 
standing to sue, which is confined to persons with proprietary interest. Finally, there is 
discretion to withhold an injunction and award equitable damages, mentioned above. This is 
not to deny that there will be many marginal cases in which it is difficult for the court to be 
satisfied that the interference is substantial, but some of the cases considered in this article - 
notably Waterhouse Properties - illustrate that this difficulty is surmountable.
140
 A broken 
view can be more ‘serious’ than a broken window and that above all is what justifies judicial 
protection.
141
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The central argument in this article is that the consensus that an injured view is not in any 
circumstances remediable within the framework of nuisance law, following Bland, takes the 
idea of the permanence of the common law principles to an implausible extreme. Although 
this conclusion is supported by so-called contextual material, the overwhelming bulk of the 
analysis is classically formalistic, in its attention to doctrine.  Thus doctrinally speaking, the 
consensus lacks formal credibility because: (1) Bland is an unreported authority, and the 
doctrine of precedent provides special rules relating to the handling of such cases;
142
 (2) it is 
unclear that the exclusion of pleasing views is the ratio decidendi of Bland, insofar as Mr 
Bland may not have suffered, or indeed claimed to have suffered, loss to a pleasing view; (3) 
Bland has received a mixed judicial reception (e.g. it was criticised as old fashioned by Lord 
Blackburn in Angus v Dalton); (4) Bland is difficult to reconcile with subsequent English 
authority on the heads of actionable nuisance (notably Tipping, but also Thompson Schwab); 
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(5) Bland has not been followed in case law on injured views in some legal systems elsewhere 
in the wider common law world.
143
 
 This, then, introduces a different slant on the familiar disciplinary issue of the 
divergence between ‘law in books’ and ‘law in practice’. Without detracting from the 
literature which demonstrates that practice ‘exceeds’ doctrine,
144
 it is also important to 
recognise those practical problems the ‘other way’, that stem from over-simplified 
expositions of doctrine in situations well characterised by Sugarman.
145
 The superficial 
treatment of Bland and the topic of the definition of nuisance more generally is a legacy of the 
‘textbook tradition’ which risks denying proprietors the benefits of modernisation in the law. 
The solution for the discipline is not to hasten the decline in the esteem of the textbook or 
treatise, but rather to encourage doctrinal analysis that embraces the essential corrigibility of 
statements about the content of the law. A flourishing modern law school will prioritise 
treatise writing and doctrinal work that is nuanced enough to command the respect of the 
judiciary.
146
 Thus a textbook tradition broadly understood need not be at odds with current 
higher education research funding formulas.
147
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